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I. INTRODUCTION

In Coker v. Georgia' the Supreme Court held that state legislation authorizing execution of rapists violates the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment. 2 Justice White,
writing for himself and Justices Stevens, Blackmun and Stewart,
professed an "abiding conviction" that the death penalty for rape is
"excessive." 3 Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the
judgment on the basis of their broader abiding conviction that
execution is not permissible for any crime.4 Justice Powell also
concurred in the judgment, although he did not think the death
penalty should be constitutionally foreclosed as punishment for all
convicted rapists. 5 Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
dissented.6
Coker marks a turning point in eighth amendment jurisprudence. It is the first modem -decision in which the Supreme
Court has relied on disproportionality to invalidate a punishment
under the cruel and unusual punishments clause.7 It is also the
first death penalty case in which as many as six members of the
Court have explicitly relied on substantive analysis of what conI thank the following people who read and criticized drafts of this Article and
whose thoughts I have gratefully incorporated: C. Edwin Baker, Karl E. Johnson,
Michael S. Moore, John A. Sebert, Jr., Roy G. Spece, Jr. They are not responsible
for my errors and infelicities. I also thank Edwin I. Caleb for helpful research
assistance.
1433 U.S. 584 (1977).
2 The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); see note 29 infra.
3433 U.S. at 598.
4Id. 600 (Brennan, J., concurring); i. (Marshall, J.,concurring).
SId. 601, 604 (Powell, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6Id. 604 (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
7
In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910), the Court said that
it is an Anglo-American "precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to offense." In Weems the Court held that to impose
an onerous Hispanic punishment called cadena temporal for falsifying an official
document violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause as reproduced in the
Philippine Bill of Rights. Cadena temporal consisted of at least twelve years of
imprisonment at "hard and painful" labor, in addition to perpetual future surveillance
and loss of civil rights. Id. 364. Although considerations of proportionality figured
in the Court's analysis, so did the concept of unusualness. See note 8 infra. The
Court noted that this punishment "has no fellow in American legislation," violated
the clause in "kind" because it was "unusual in its character," and violated the
clause in "degree" because it was "cruel in its excess." Id. 377. In the nearly
seven decades between Weems and Coker, Weems has often been relied upon to
support a role for proportionality or "excessiveness" in eighth amendment analysis.
As an example, see Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 324-25 (1972). Coker is the first Supreme Court case to rely exclusively
on the proportionality concept.
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stitutes cruel punishment rather than on issues of procedure or the
proper extent of judicial review. Most of the recent development
of eighth amendment doctrine has occurred in the context of the
Supreme Court's struggle with the death penalty. This Article reviews that development in order to draw some general conclusions
about the constitutional standards that should apply when a punishment is challenged under the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
Two interrelated types of standards, or ways of thinking about
standards, shape the analysis: standards of review and substantive
standards.
The first half of the Article examines the issues surrounding
standards of review, and asserts that an analysis of the risk of error
entailed in applying a particular punishment should determine the
appropriate standard of review in each case. Risk of error analysis,
which takes into account the strength of the interests at stake, dictates that standards of review, or levels of judicial scrutiny, will vary
as a function of several factors. The major factors and the principles
by which they are or ought to be weighed are considered; those
principles lead to the conclusion that "rational basis" deference is
wrong in cases challenging the death penalty.
The second half of the Article deals with the substantive question of how to determine what punishments are cruel within the
meaning of the eighth amendment.8 I argue that the Court is
8 This Article does not deal directly with the question of what, if anything, is
added or changed by the word "unusual' in the clause. In Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Brennan reviewed the Court's passing references to the
"unusual" component of the clause, and concluded: "The question [whether the
word 'unusual' has any qualitative meaning distinct from 'cruel'], in any event, is
of minor zignificance; this Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning of
the Clause simply by parsing its words." Id. 276 n.20. The view that the word
refers to "illegal" punishments-those whose severity and effectiveness cannot be
gauged and monitored because they are outside the ambit of known and authorized
punishments in the Anglo-American legal system--seems most plausible. Cf.
Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning,
57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 855-59 (1969) (arguing that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 was, in part, an objection to
unauthorized punishments, although use of the word "unusual" was due to chance
or sloppy draftsmanship). Infliction of a punishment of this sort could very well
be cruel because arbitrary, and unusualness should thus figure in a complete analysis
of cruelty. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 318 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of
the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. Rxv. 838, 855-57 (1972).
The word
"unusual" in the clause may mean, therefore, that punishments hitherto unkmown
to our penal system should be closely scrutinized for elements of cruelty. This
role for "unusualness" is suggested by the Court's decisions in Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100 n.32 (1958) (denationalization) and Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 377 (1910) (cadena temporal). This Article incorporates "unusualness"
into its general analysis of "cruelty" at text accompanying notes 145-46 infra,
although its primary focus is on the meaning of the clause with respect to such
usual punishments as death and imprisonment.
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correct in drawing the clause's substantive meaning "from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society," but incorrect to the extent that it tries to glean the
content of those "evolving standards of decency" merely from objective indicia like legislative enactments, referenda or opinion
polls. The Court must search for a deeper moral consensus on the
meaning of cruelty in order to determine whether a specific punishment comports with current standards of decency. The analysis
requires evaluation of shared societal notions about cruelty and,
especially in light of the Court's commitment to proportionality
revealed in Coker, investigation of theories justifying various forms
of punishment.
The end result of these inquiries is that, although maintaining
the conceptual distinction may be useful, standards of review and
substantive standards ultimately coalesce. When no moral consensus is discernible as to the cruelty of a punishment, as I will suggest is true for the death penalty, the Court will not be able to reach
a decision on it by a substantive analysis utilizing current standards
of decency. Nevertheless, in such a case there is likely to exist a
moral consensus dictating how the risk of error ought to be
allocated in the face of the moral uncertainty as to the punishment's
substantive validity. The allocation of risk of error, like the substantive analysis, depends on normative considerations concerning
the dignity governmental institutions must afford individual citizens.
The normative considerations that inform the substantive analysis
thus also govern the standard of review the Supreme Court should
utilize in scrutinizing the constitutionality of legislation imposing a
criminal sanction. As background for the development of a theory
of review taking both types of standards into account, Part II of this
Article sets out a typology of cruel and unusual punishment claims
and outlines the Court's recent decisions interpreting the cruel and
unusual punishments clause.
II.

CURRENT TREATMENT OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE

A. Typology of Cr2iel and Unusual Punishments Claims
The cruel and unusual punishments clause has given rise to five
basic categories of limitations on criminal punishment.' 0 They are:
9

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
Article does not address the issue whether the clause limits punishments

10 This

considered to be outside the criminal process.

See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.

19781
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Type 1 (Means of Punishment), limiting legislative power to
authorize means of punishment. The issue in a Type 1 case takes
the form, "Is it constitutional for the government to impose punishment X for any crime?" Adjudication involves abstract consideration of the nature of punishment X. The primary exemplar of the
Type 1 case is Trop v. Dulles," in which the Supreme Court found
denationalization to be an impermissible punishment for wartime
desertion, even though it assumed that punishing deserters with
death was permissible. The Type 1 "core case," often mentioned by
the Court in dictum,

12

is the clause's limitation on legislative au-

thority to impose physical torture, like the rack, thumbscrew or
drawing and quartering, as punishment for crime.
Type 2 (Proportionality), (A) limiting legislative power to authorize a means or amount of punishment for a particularcrime and
(B) limiting judicial power to impose a means or amount of punishment on a specific criminal. The issue in a Type 2(A) case takes
the form, "Is it constitutional for the government to impose punishment X on any offender found guilty of crime Y?" The issue in a
Type 2(B) case takes the form, "Is it constitutional for the government to impose punishment X on offender N for crime Y, committed
in a particular manner and under particular circumstances?" Both
cases require a proportionality inquiry, though at different levels of
abstraction. Adjudication of Type 2 cases involves consideration of
the punishment, the crime and whether the punishment fits the
crime. Examples of the Type 2(A) case are Coker v. Georgia, 3 rejecting the death penalty for rape, and, perhaps, Weems v. United
States,14 rejecting the Philippine punishment of cadena temporal for
falsifying an official document. An example of the Type 2(B) case
is People v. Sinclair,1 overturning a nine year prison sentence for
651, 664-71 (1977) (cruel and unusual punishments clause not applicable to corporal punishment of public school children).
11356 U.S. 86 (1958).
12See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910) (quartering,
hanging in chains, castration); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (burning
at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel). See also State v. Williams, 77 Mo.

310, 312-13 (1883) (burning at stake, cutting off nose, ears or limbs, forced
starvation, boiling to death).
13 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
14217 U.S. 349 (1910).

Weems also involved the element of unusualness.

See notes 7 & 8 supra.
15387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972) (per curiam). Two justices in
Sinclair held that the sentence imposed was "demonstrably and grossly excessive, in
the light of the depravity of the criminal . . . and in light of the usual and

customary disposition of those convicted of like conduct ....
N.W.2d at 906 (Brennan &Adams, JJ., concurring).

".Id. at 153, 194
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possession of two marijuana cigarettes.'
Type 3 (Power to Criminalize), limiting legislative power to
make conduct criminal. The issue in a Type 3 case takes the form,
"Is it constitutional for the government to impose any punishment
7
on anyone for defined conduct Z?" Robinson v. California,1
the
case that exemplies this category, held that it was unconstitutional to
punish persons merely for their "status" as narcotics addicts. In a
sense, Type 3 cases are a subset of cases within Type 2(A)-that is,
any punishment is disproportionate if the defined offense is deemed
not criminalizable.' s
8
1 The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case using the Type 2(B)
rationale. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Coker, argued that it would have
been more appropriate to consider the suitability of the death penalty for rape on
a case-by-case (Type 2(B)) basis. 433 U.S. at 607. Justice Powell adopted a
similar stance in his Furman dissent, 408 U.S. at 461, but in his concurrence in
Coker he argued that a narrow Type 2(A) limitation should be applied. 433 U.S.
at 604.
Earlier opinions construing the cruel and unusual punishments clause assumed
that Type 2(B) decisions were inappropriate for judicial review. See, e.g., United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
In Rosenberg, Judge Jerome Frank authored a unanimous opinion upholding the
sentence of execution imposed upon Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for espionage.
Writing for himself alone, he went on to evaluate the "sixty years of undeviating
federal precedents, [holding] that an appellate court has no power to modify a
sentence." Id. 604. Addressing the Rosenbergs" claim that their particular death
sentences violated the eighth amendment, Judge Frank noted that:
Several courts have ruled that a sentence within the limits of a valid statute
cannot amount to "cruel and unusual punishments", that, when a statute
provides for such punishment, the statute only can be thus attacked ...
No federal decision seems to have held cruel and unusual any sentence
imposed under a statute which itself was constitutional.
Id. 607 (citations and footnote omitted). Assuming arguendo that "a particular
sentence, within the literal terms of [a valid] statute [may violate the eighth
amendment] because of the specific circumstances of the case," Judge Frank found
that "[n]o such circumstances exist in this case." Id. 608 (footnote omitted).
17 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
In Robinson the offense was deemed not criminalizable because the statute in question proscribed a "chronic condition" or "status"
rather than voluntary conduct. Id. 665-66.
18 just as Type 2(A) subsumes Type 3 cases adjudicating the state's ability
to punish, Type 2(B) subsumes Type 3 cases in which judicial imposition of
punishment upon particular offenders may be challenged. Thus, punishment of
offender N whose conduct is deemed involuntary because of insanity or duress, or
more aptly, because N engaged in the conduct in a state of automatism, would be
disproportionate. This parallel limitation is formalized in the doctrine of criminal
responsibility, which limits criminal punishment to persons considered responsible
moral agents. See, e.g., H. L. A. HAnT, PUI ESMENT AND E sPONSnMrry 28-53
(1968). In light of this analogy it is not surprising that some commentators thought
Robinson harbored the seed of a constitutional criminal responsibility doctrine.
See Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 463, 474 (1967);
Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 127 n.71;
Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, 79 HAnv. L. RLv. 635, 646, 648 (1966); see also Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L.
Rzv. 322, 385-86 (1966). So far this seed'has not germinated. The Court has

1978]

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DEATH

Type 4 (Nonjudicial Discretion), limiting official discretion to
carry out otherwise permissible punishment. In Type 4 cases the
issue usually takes the form, "Is it constitutional for government
officials to subject offender N to certain specific conditions ancillary
to authorized valid punishment?" For example, in Estelle v.
Gamble, 9 the Supreme Court held that "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners" was proscribed by the eighth
amendment. 20
Type 5 (Procedural Due Process), limiting legislative power to
authorize the procedures by which a specific punishment is imposed.
The issue in a Type 5 case takes the form, "Is it constitutional for
the government to impose punishment X on any offender selected
by means of these enacted sentencing procedures?" This type of
21
eighth amendment adjudication surfaced in Furman v. Georgia,
in which three justices thought that the death penalty, as administered under statutes allowing death to be imposed at the jury's
discretion, violated the clause because of the danger of arbitrary or
unfair imposition on individual offenders.22 It has since been the
dominant rationale in cases applying the clause to the death penalty
for murder. 23

The foregoing categories are not perfectly distinct; Type 4, in
particular, may overlap with the others. For example, it overlaps
with Type 2(B) to the extent that judicial execution of a flexible
made it clear that the Robinson approach will be sparingly used; indeed, it may be
completely sui generis. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (plurality opinion).
'1 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
20

The Court found no valid Type 4 claim in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), in which it held that it was not unconstitutional
for Louisiana authorities to try again after their first attempt to electrocute the
petitioner miscarried. The core cases within this category, however, challenge
deplorable prison conditions and inadequate prison health care. E.g., Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971). See Robbins and Buser, Primitive Conditions of Prison Confinement: An
Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STA,. L. REV. 893 (1977).
21408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22 Id. 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. 310-14 (White, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
23 See text accompanying notes 31-47 infra. It could be argued that this due
process rationale was adopted in the Furman concurrences because a straightforward
due process attack on the constitutionality of imposing death under statutes allowing
complete jury discretion had only recently been rejected in McGautha v. California,
402 U.S. 183 (1971). See note 31 infra.
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legislative mandate (indeterminate sentencing) is viewed as involving the same kind of official discretion as the more typically nonjudicial discretion involved in parole decisions. Type 4 also overlaps with Type 1 to the extent that a proscribed sanction such as
beatings by prison guards is considered unconstitutional because
both beyond the legislative power to authorize and beyond official
discretion to impose.
The Supreme Court has so far delineated only three categories
of eighth amendment claims. At times it has combined Types 1
and 4 (limiting means of punishment and nonjudicial discretion)
into one category; 24 it has not recognized the procedural category
(Type 5) as a separate type of limitation. It is desirable to distinguish between Type 1 and Type 4 because the standard of review
(or level of scrutiny) the Court adopts will vary depending upon
whether it is reviewing a legislative enactment authorizing punishment, the sentence imposed by a court or the conduct of an official
administering authorized punishment. It is desirable to distinguish
Type 5 to facilitate consideration of whether procedural reasoning
is appropriate in eighth amendment cases. It seems clear that Types
1 and 2 include the core cruel and unusual punishments cases, while
the limitations of Types 3, 4 and 5 overlap the due process clause.
The typology facilitates analyses of both these hybrid claims and the
core cases, maintaining the distinctions between them. It also emphasizes the individual and governmental interests at issue in a
particular case, and thereby enables a reviewing court to make a
reasoned, explicit decision concerning the standard of review to be
applied.
This Article's principal purpose is to develop a theory of
judicial review of legislative enactments for claims falling within
the core categories of Type 1 and Type 2(A). The Supreme Court
has recently decided cases within these categories when it faced the
questions whether a state legislature may authorize death as punishment for any crime, 25 and if so, whether death may be authorized as
26
punishment for the crime of rape.

24 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977)
(juxtaposing Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), as authority
for the proposition that the cruel and unusual punishments clause limits the kinds
of punishments that may be imposed on those convicted of crimes).
25 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972).

26 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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B. The Supreme Court's Approaches to the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause
The origin of the clause and the history of eighth amendment
adjudication need not be reviewed here. 27 It is significant, however,
that those who have set out to recount the clause's judicial history
can discuss in a very few pages every Supreme Court case dealing
with the clause. Eighth amendment claims were rare during the
Court's first 175 years-the clause was discussed in only nine cases
prior to its incorporation into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in 1962.28 Doubtless part of the reason for the
clause's dormancy is that the Court only recently became fully committed to the proposition that the clause limits state legislatures as
well as Congress.29 The long quiescence of the clause may also be a
function of its Delphic quality-it is easier to tell what circumstances
draw into play other clauses of the Bill of Rights dealing with
criminal justice, for example, double jeopardy or self-incrimination,
than the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments, where the
operative terms are vague and ambiguous. Moreover, as long as
the Court took for granted that the clause extended only to punishments that the Framers thought cruel in 1789,30 there was little need
to invoke it; for there was little danger that an American legislature
would authorize the rack, the wheel, or drawing and quartering as
criminal punishments.
27
In his concurring opinion in Furman, Justice Marshall reviewed the origin
of the clause in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the circumstances surrounding its
inclusion in our Bill of Rights in 1789, and its case history in the Supreme Court.
408 U.S. at 316-28 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Granucci, supra note 8;
Note, Aversion Therapy: Punishment as Treatment and Treatment as Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 880, 928 n.238 (1976).
28
Incorporation was effected in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
See notes 2 supra & 29 infra. Pre-Robinson cases that discussed the clause include:
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947); Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903);
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-41, 370-71 (1892) (Field, J. & Harlan &
Brewer, JJ., dissenting); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah,
99 U.S. 130 (1878); and Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867).
29As early as 1947 it appeared that some members of the Court were tacitly
assuming that the fourteenth amendment due process clause "incorporated" the
cruel and unusual punishments clause and made it applicable to the states. See
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (plurality opinion)
("the Fourteenth would prohibit by its due process clause execution by a state in
a cruel manner"). The tacit "incorporation" effected by Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962), has been verified in later opinions. See Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 328 n.34 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 6 n.6 (1964); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 & n.7 (1963).
ao This historical view of the clause's substantive meaning will be discussed at
text accompanying notes 161-66 infra.
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The Court had scanty institutional history to guide it, then,
and no well-worn grooves of eighth amendment jurisprudence
through which to channel its thinking, when, in 1972, it was faced
with the quintessential hard case-the death penalty.3 1 The resulting decision, Furman v. Georgia, 2 was a jurisprudential debacle. 3
The Court issued a per curiam reversal of the judgments below
insofar as they left "undisturbed the death sentence imposed," 84
followed by nine separate opinions resting on three categories of
rationale. Justices Douglas, Stewart and White put aside the question whether it was ever constitutional to execute anyone (the
Type I inquiry), and decided only that it was unconstitutional to
execute anyone under current procedures, which they found to be
arbitrary and/or discriminatory (inaugurating Type 5).3 Although
their reasoning did not articulate how the purposes of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause differ from those of the due process and
equal protection clauses, at least their approach required little
judicial innovation regarding the clause's substantive meaning.
Four dissenters would have found that the petitioners could constitutionally be executed, but they, by and large, skirted the substantive issue by means of another route. Justices Powell, Burger,
Blackmun and Rehnquist, perhaps also influenced by the issue's
recent presentation in the context of the due process clause,3 6 said
that principles of judicial restraint and deference to state legislative
judgments did not permit them to inquire very deeply into the
31 Challenges to the death penalty shifted to the eighth amendment after
attempts based on traditional due process doctrine proved unsuccessful in McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The McGautha Court held that where death is
an authorized punishment, submission of the punishment issue to the jury without
specific standards to guide its discretion does not deprive a criminal defendant of
due process of law. Id. 196.
32408 U.S. 238 (1972).
33
Justice Rehnquist has referred to the Court's expression of its concerns in
Furman as "glossolalial." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 317 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Rockwell v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 18
Cal. 3d 420, 556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976), Judge Clark noted that
in the four years between Furman and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and
its companion cases, "all was confusion" as states attempted to enact constitutional
death penalty statutes. 18 Cal. 3d at 436, 556 P.2d at 1116-17, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
666 (Clark, J., concurring). He added that "[were it not literally a matter of
life or death, the entire affair would assume the character of a comedy of errors.
Id. at 437, 556 P.2d at 1118, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 667. For an analysis of the
nine opinions in Furman and the resultant uncertainties, see Polsby, The Death of
Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
34 408 U.S. at 240.
35 Id. 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. 310-14 (White, J., concurring).
36 See note 31 supra.
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matter.3 7 Only Justices Brennan and Marshall inquired into the
clause's substantive meaning, and they concluded that the eighth
amendment precluded execution as a permissible means of punishment under any circumstances. 8s Though the rationale of legislative deference attracted the most adherents in Furman the
alliance of the three Justices who focused on procedure with the two
who relied on the clause's substantive meaning resulted in reversal
and an uneasy constitutional limbo for the death penalty during
the next four years.
Gregg v. Georgia39 and its companion cases, the Court's second
go-round with the death penalty, elaborated the procedural rationale. Justices Brennan and Marshall remained the only two who
focused primarily on the substantive meaning of the clause; the
thrust of the holdings in Gregg and its companions is procedural.
The Justices of the plurality (Stewart, Powell and Stevens) held that
imposition of the death penalty for murder may be neither mandatory nor left to standardless discretion, but rather must be subject
to guided discretion vested in the sentencing authority. Mandatory40
type statutes were struck down in Woodson v. North Carolina
and Roberts v. Louisiana41 (with the aid of concurrences in both
decisions by Justices Brennan and Marshall 42). Guided discretiontype statutes were upheld in Gregg,43 Jurek v. Texas,44 and Proffitt
v. Florida45 (with the aid of concurrences from the four justices
who would have upheld the death penalty in all of the cases 46).
The plurality's discussion in Gregg focused on what forms of
discretion and checks on discretion in imposing the death penalty
are constiiutionally required. Their central holding was that legis37408 U.S. at 383-84 (Burger, CJ., Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). See id. 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. 431-33 (Powell, J., dissentiug); id. 467-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38 Id. 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).

39 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
40428 U.S. 280 (1976).
41428 U.S. 325 (1976).
42428 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. 306 (Marshall, J., concurring);
id. 336 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
43 428 U.S. at 196-207 (plurality opinion).
44 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion).
45 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (plurality opinion).
46 428 U.S. at 277 (White, J., Burger, C.J. & Rehmquist, J., concurring); id.
279 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. 260 (White, J., Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); id. 261 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

1000

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 126:989

lation authorizing execution for murder is consistent with the
eighth amendment if the sentencer is required to consider the individual offender and the offense, weighing specified aggravating
circumstances against mitigating factors which may also (but need
not) be specified.

47

In Coker Justice White shifted the focus to the Type 2(A)
(proportionality) category of limitation on punishment, in which
the issue is whether the punishment enacted by the legislature exceeds the constitutional limit for a particular crime. The four
members of the Coker plurality (Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun
and Stevens) relied neither on Type 5 procedural limitations nor on
a Type 1 (means of punishment) inquiry into the per se constitutionality of the death penalty.48

Instead, the plurality found

death to be disproportionate to the crime of rape and, therefore,
unconstitutionally cruel. 49 The explicit recognition of the concept
of proportionality in a sense marks the coming of age of eighth
amendment jurisprudence, with far-reaching consequences for the
future elaboration of the clause's meaning. In elaborating that
meaning, a more reasoned approach to standard of review is sorely
needed. The analytical problems with the approaches hitherto
taken by the Court are reflected in the widely fluctuating adjudicatory attitudes of the individual Justices during the past five
terms. In Part III those varying attitudes are analyzed, and an
attempt is made to fashion a theory of review that can provide more
consistent and rational adjudication of eighth amendment issues.
47

See, e.g., id. 188-95 (plurality opinion). For an excellent discussion of these
five cases and constitutional problems inherent in their approach, see The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HAnv. L. REv. 56, 63-76 (1976).
48
Between Gregg and Coker the Court decided a number of cases challenging
death sentences, but the opinions either relied on Gregg or on a variety of procedural
and non-eighth amendment'grounds. See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977)
(imposition of death sentence under statute approved in Proffitt on offender who
committed murder while Florida had no constitutional death penalty violated
neither equal protection nor prohibition against ex post facto laws); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam) (reversed mandatory death sentence
for murder of policeman as inconsistent with Gregg rationale); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977) (reversed death penalty imposed by trial judge who based
his sentence on report defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain as inconsistent with due process); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (execution
allowed to proceed because defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of all federal rights); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976) (death sentence
reversed because prospective juror who expressed scruples, but not an irrevocable
commitment, against its imposition was excluded at voir dire).
49 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Justice Powell concurred
in the judgment, but stated that he thought a narrower inquiry should have been
undertaken by the Court, and that the constitutionality of the death penalty for
particularly brutal rapes should not have been foreclosed. Id. 601 (Powell, J.,
concurring). See text accompanying notes 95-96 infra.
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III.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Approaches to Standards of Review Under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause
Standards of adjudication determine the quantum of proof of
facts required to decide a case, and assign to one party or the other
the burden of establishing the requisite degree of certainty. They
also determine the relevance and weight of particular kinds of
evidence and the permissibility and weight of particular kinds of
legal arguments. A "standard of review," whether said to be applicable to review of a lower court decision or of a legislative decision, reflects all of these factors. Because degrees of certainty,
types of evidence, and varieties of argument vary through a range,
the possible standards of review that are theoretically open to a
reviewing court also vary through a range. Legal precedent or
analysis of the competing interests at stake, however, may limit a
court's choice of adjudicatory attitude, whether or not that choice
is articulated. If one envisions the range of possible adjudicatory
attitudes as a continuum or spectrum, 50 "judicial legislation" or
extreme judicial activism occupies one pole and "judicial abdication
50 The spectrum analogy was used by Justice Marshall to describe the range of
standards of judicial review in cases invoking the equal protection clause. See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973)
(Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In Rodriguez Marshall wrote:
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection
cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate
standard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this Court's
decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization.
A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied
a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of
the Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular
classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal
importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.

Id. 98-99.
This article adopts the word "spectrum" for the notion of variable standards

of review, though perhaps the word "continuum" is more precise. For thoughtful

observations concerning the "continuun" of adjudicatory attitudes in the theory and
practice of constitutional adjudication see Spece, The Least Restrictive Alternative
As An Independent, Preferred Constitutional Standard of Review and Justifying
Invigorated Scrutiny: Civil Commitment As A Case Study, 19 Amrz. L. IMv. (forthcoming 1978). More traditional commentators still speak of the two-tiered
equal protection analysis that Justice Marshall thought inadequate to describe the
Court's practice, although there is a recent tendency to perceive a "middle tier" that
is less rigorous than "strict scrutiny" but more demanding than "mere rationality."
See, e.g., Bice, Standards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 689 (1977); Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
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of responsibility" or extreme deference occupies the other. In
terms of the stylized postures or "tiers" often said to be applicable
in equal protection and substantive due process analysis, possible
adjudicatory attitudes range from the "mere rationality" test to the
"compelling state interest" test.rl In cruel and unusual punishment
cases confusion about the appropriate adjudicatory attitude has
prevailed, and in the cases challenging the constitutionality of the
death penalty a surprising observation can be made. Not only have
certain Justices adopted different adjudicatory attitudes from one
case to the next without appearing to notice it, but the attitudes
expressed or implied in the various opinions have often been so
disparate as to range from one end of the spectrum to the other;
from the rhetoric of extreme activism to that of extreme deference.
1. Attitudes of Members of the Court
Justice White twice changed colors within the spectrum of
judicial review during the course of ruling on cruel and unusual
punishments claims from 1972 to 1977. He adopted a rather activist
stance in Furman,according discretionary death sentence legislation
2 He
less deference than he had earlier in McGautha v. California.5
stated that "past and present legislative judgment with respect to the
death penalty loses much of its force when viewed in light of the
recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the jury," G3
and concluded that the manner of implementing legislative policy
presented in Furman violated the eighth amendment.5 4 Justice
51 The strictest form of scrutiny typically involves shifting the burden of persuasion to the state to show that its action is justified, with the further proviso that

the state's action cannot be justified no matter how important and legitimate its goals,
if measures less restrictive of protected individual interests would serve as well.
It is probably misleading to speak of this concatenation as one "standard of review."
Burden of persuasion is a concept analytically distinct from scrutiny of goals and
means, and is related more closely to the decision of where the risk of error ought
to be placed. See text accompanying notes 121-30 infra. Furthermore, the less
restrictive alternative concept is analytically distinct from the concept of scrutiny

of goals, since it involves the selection of permissible means. It is possible to
articulate substantive concerns that demand the use of the least restrictive alternative
and yet would place the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to prove that the
state's chosen means are not the least restrictive. See Spece, supra note 50.
"Means" and "goals" coalesce when the goal is non-cruel punishment and cruelty
is defined as excessiveness. See note 99 infra.
52
In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), Justice White joined in the
majority's opinion upholding an arrangement whereby juries were granted unguided
discretion to sentence convicted murderers to death. Furman was a challenge to
three death sentences imposed at the discretion of a jury--one defendant had been
convicted of murder and two had been convicted of rape. 408 U.S. at 240.
53 408 U.S. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
54 Id.
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White based his conclusion on his personal knowledge, derived from
years of experience, that the death sentence was so infrequently
imposed under the types of statutes before the Court that its
imposition on any particular individual was arbitrary and of such
insignificant social value as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 55 He did not require the petitioners to prove that this infrequency of imposition meant that the penalty had lost its social
value and was now being arbitrarily imposed, although the states
contended that its use was being reserved by juries for only the most
heinous crimes. He, likewise, did not require petitioners to prove
that the statutes had been applied arbitrarily in their particular
cases.
Justice White's adjudicatory attitude shifted appreciably toward
deference when, in Gregg and its companion cases, he reviewed the
mandatory and guided discretion statutes authorizing execution for
murder. Justice White, with Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and Blackmun, favored upholding all the challenged
murder statutes. As to the doubtful deterrent efficacy of the death
6 that "it
penalty, he wrote, dissenting in Roberts v. Louisiana,"
would be neither a proper or wise exercise of the power of judicial
review to refuse to accept the reasonable conclusions of Congress
and 35 state legislatures that there are indeed certain circumstances
in which the death penalty is the more efficacious deterrent of
crime." W Evidently, Justice White felt that the sentencing schemes
did not create the problem of infrequent imposition leading to
arbitrariness which he had identified in Furman, because he stated
in Gregg: "I decline to interfere with the manner in which Georgia
has chosen to enforce [laws against murder] on what is simply an
assertion of lack of faith in the ability of the system of justice to
operate in a fundamentally fair manner." 1s
Justice White returned to a more activist adjudicatory attitude

in Coker, embracing the principle that it is the Court's constitutional function to be the ultimate arbiter on the cruelty of a punishment.r9 He used no rhetoric of rational basis deference; he did
55 Id. 312-13.
5C428 U.S. 325 (1976).
57 Id. 355 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White deemed the legislative conclusions "reasonable" despite his acceptance of the fact that the only reasonable
conclusion was that the evidence was inconclusive. See id. 354-55.
58 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
59 Writing for the Coker plurality, Justice White stated: "The Constitution
contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment,"
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not inquire whether the state legislature had acted in a "clearly
irrational" manner in specifying death as a punishment for rape.
This was one of Chief Justice Burger's objections to the Coker
plurality opinion2 0 The Chief Justice argued in dissent that it was
"not irrational-nor constitutionally impermissible-for a legislature
to make the penalty more severe than the criminal act it punishes
in the hope it would deter wrongdoing." 61 For that reason, the
Chief Justice argued, the Court's judgment that the punishment
was disproportionate to the crime was irrelevant and an improper
62
exercise of judicial review.
The Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist have consistently
adopted such a deferential adjudicatory attitude. Dissenting in
Furman,the Chief Justice wrote that legislative enactments must be
presumed to conform to required standards of decency, and that
this presumption "can only be negated by unambiguous and compelling evidence of legislative default." 68 In his own Furman dissent Justice Rehnquist argued that whereas legislative overreaching
might sacrifice individual rights protected by the Constitution,
"judicial over-reaching" might "result in sacrifice of the equally
important right of the people to govern themselves." 6- He implied
that the Court should always err on the side of deference because
"[t]he error resulting from a mistaken upholding of an individual's
constitutional claim against the validity of a legislative enactment is
a good deal more serious" 65 than the error involved in mistakenly
upholding an unconstitutional law. This, he said, is because the
latter type of error "while wrongfully depriving the individual of a
right secured to him by the Constitution, nonetheless does so by
but legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape in jurisdictions other than

the one vhose statute was before the Court strongly confirms our own judgment"
that the death penalty for rape is disproportionate.

433 U.S. at 597 (plurality

opinion).
6Old. 619 (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61 Id.
62 Id. 620-22.
63408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, CJ., Blackmun, Powell & Rlehnquist, JJ., dis-

senting). The Chief Justice also rejected the propriety of shifting the burden of
proof to the states under a compelling governmental interest/least restrictive means
test:
[Tlo shift the burden to the States is to provide an illusory solution to an
enormously complex problem. If it were proper to put the States to the
test of demonstrating the deterrent value of capital punishment, we could
just as well ask them to prove the need for life imprisonment or any other
punishment.
Id. 396.
64 Id. 470 (Rlehnquist, J., dissenting).
65 Id. 468.
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simply letting stand a duly enacted law of a democratically chosen
legislative body." 66
Justices Brennan and Marshall have consistently adopted an
activist eighth amendment adjudicatory attitude, 7 although Brennan's is the more activist of the two. Brennan espouses a compelling state interest/least restrictive means test, although he does not
so label it.68 On two issues in Furman,Brennan imposed the burden
of proof on the states: first, to show that the discretionary death
statutes had not been enforced arbitrarily; 60 second, to prove that a
valid penal purpose required imposition of the death penalty as
opposed to a less severe sanction. Considering the latter issue,
Brennan began with the guiding principle "that a punishment must
not be degrading to human dignity" 70 and concluded that the
dignity principle dictates that "an unusually severe and degrading
method of punishment may not be excessive in view of the purposes
for which it is inflicted." 71 These principles compelled Justice
Brennan to apply least restrictive means analysis: if "society has
indicated it does not regard [an unusually severe punishment as]
acceptable," and the state cannot prove that the punishment serves
"any penal purpose more effectively than a significantly less drastic
66 Id.
67
justice Douglas also adopted an activist adjudicatory attitude in Furman.
He found the theme of equal protection to be implicit in the eighth amendment, and
suggested that it imposed a duty on the judiciary "to see to it that general laws
are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottil, to unpopular groups." Id. 256-57
(Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas did not place any burden on petitioners
to prove arbitrary or irrational operation of the discretionary statutes, holding them
"unconstitutional in their operation" because they were "pregnant with discrimination." Id.
68 Justice Brennan's stance in Furman implied the view that the "right to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment" is like the right to freedom of expression,
requiring the strictest judicial scrutiny when threatened by legislation. See
id. 268-69 (Brennan, J., concurring). He stated that "Ej]udicial enforcement of the
Clause . . . cannot be evaded by invoking the obvious truth that legislatures have
the power to prescribe punishments for crimes" and that the Court "must not, in
the guise of 'judicial restraint,' abdicate [its] fundamental responsibility to enforce
the Bill of Rights." Id. 269. In his Gregg dissent Brennan argued that the Court
"inescapably has the duty" to decide the moral issue posed by the death sentence,
428 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) and that he would rule against capital
punishment on that ground alone. Id. 230-31.
69 justice Brennan argued that selective application of the death penalty creates
an inference of unfairness that the states must rebut: "When a country of over 200
million people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50 times a year,
the inference is strong that the punishment is not being regularly and fairly applied.
To dispel it would indeed require a clear showing of nonarbitrary infliction." 408
U.S. at 293 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
7oId. 281.
71 Id. 300. Justice Brennan argued that a punishment was "excessive" if it
"serves no penal purpose more effectively than a less severe punishment." Id. 280.
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punishment," then that punishment is "cruel and unusual." 72 Because the evidence supporting the proposition that execution deters
more effectively than imprisonment was inconclusive, 73 Brennan
concluded that the "punishment of death is .

.

.

'cruel and un-

usual'" and could no longer be constitutionally imposed for crime. 74
In contrast to Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall has not used
the activist rhetoric which includes shifting the burden of proof or
persuasion to the government. Justice Marshall argued in Furman
that the "entire thrust of the Eighth Amendment is .

.

.

against

'that which is excessive'." 75 This principle led him to "examine
whether less severe penalties" could achieve the state's penological
goals.7 6 Accepting that deterrence is a proper penal aim, he
assumed that the burden of proof on the issue of whether death
deters better than life imprisonment was on petitioners, not on the
state. But he thought they had met it; 77 that is, he thought there
was evidence to establish that death is not a superior deterrent.
Engaging in some scrutiny of state goals, Justice Marshall met the
argument that the death penalty might be non-excessive because it
provides extra retribution by declaring that retribution for its own
sake is not a permissible penological goal. 78 Marshall made clear
in his Gregg dissent that he thinks a utilitarian form of retributivism (to prevent people from taking the law into their own
hands) might be a legitimate penological goal; 79 but he has assumed
the death penalty is not necessary to achieve this goal, and in neither
Furman nor Gregg did he place any burden on petitioners to show
that execution is "too" retributive. Marshall grounded his ultimate
finding that the death penalty was unconstitutionally cruel in the
72 Id. 286.

73 See id. 301-02.
74

Id. 305.

75 Id. 332 (Marshall, J., concurring).
76 Id. 342.
77 Id. 353, 359. He reaffirmed his conclusion regarding the deterrence issue
in Gregg after examining additional evidence. See 428 U.S. at 233-37 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
78 justice Marshall concluded that retribution "is a goal that the legislature

cannot constitutionally pursue as its sole justification for capital punishment.....

concurring).
408 U.S. at 363 (Marshall, J.,
79
In his Gregg dissent, Marshall implied that punishments which serve retributive purposes in order to preclude private citizens from "taleng the law into
their own hands" were not cruel per se because they serve a utilitarian function.
428 U.S. at 238-39 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 250-

53 infra.
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rhetoric of judicial deference: "There is no rational basis for concluding capital punishment is not excessive." 80
Justice Stewart, in Furman, adopted an activist adjudicatory
attitude similar to Justice White's. He concluded that discretionary
statutes permitted the death penalty to be arbitrarily ("wantonly"
and "freakishly") imposed.8 He, too, required no proof that the
statutes operated capriciously; it was enough that they had that
potential. Then, in upholding the guided discretion death penalty
statute in Gregg, Justice Stewart shifted his adjudicatory attitude to
the opposite end of the spectrum. His rhetoric invoked the presumption of constitutional validity and the "heavy burden" which
rested on "those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people." 82 He concluded that the petitioners had not
adduced evidence to show the Georgia legislature "clearly wrong,"
8
and that absent such evidence the statute must be upheld.
84
Meanwhile, in Woodson v. North Carolina,
a companion case

to Gregg, Justice Stewart found that a mandatory death penalty
statute for murder was unconstitutional. In doing so he assumed
that the legislature had misread Furman in attempting to enact a
constitutional death penalty statutes 5 He also concluded-by assuming that jury nullification would occur-that the statute would not
alleviate the arbitrariness that caused the discretionary statutes to
fail in Furman.6 Furthermore, because execution is final and ir8
0Yet Justice Marshall stated that "[tihe point has now been reached at which
deference to the legislatures is tantamount to abdication of our judicial roles as
factfinders, judges, and ultimate arbiters of the Constitution." 408 U.S. at 359
(Marshall, J.,concurring). He also implied in a footnote that the type of strict
scrutiny used in substantive due process analysis was appropriate to the eighth
amendment challenge to the death penalty because "capital punishment deprives
an individual of a fundamental right (i.e., the right to life)" and, therefore, "the
State needs a compelling interest to justify it." Id. 359 n.141. Marshall thought
that the purpose of the cruel and unusual punishments clause could be reformulated
as a substantive due process limitation ("punishment may not be more severe than
is necessary to serve the legitimate ends of the state"). Id.
81 Id. 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
82 428 U.S. at 175 (plurality opinion).
83 Id. 186-87. justice Stewart made it clear that he thought compelling governmental interest/least restrictive means scrutiny was inappropriate to this case,
stating that the Court "may not require the legislature to select the least severe
penalty possible." Id. 175. Quoting Justice Powelrs dissent in Furman, he said
the Court may not "invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe
penalties adequate to serve the ends of penology," although "the sanction imposed
cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous
infliction of suffering." Id. 182-83 (quoting 408 U.S. at 451 (Powell, I.,
dissenting) ).
84 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
85 See id. 298-301.
s6 Id.302.03.
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revocable, he concluded that sentencing procedures "must take into
account the individual defendant's character and circumstances." S
Though the question whether to authorize or require consideration
of such factors is usually a "policy" judgment for the legislature to
make, Justice Stewart held that their consideration is constitutionally compelled in capital cases.8 8 Thus, Stewart seemed to utilize
the rhetoric of deference only when he thought the challenged
statutes should be upheld; when faced with the mandatory sentence
statutes in Woodson, he tacitly departed from the posture of strict
deference that he expressly adopted in Gregg. 9 In Coker, Stewart
joined in White's moderately activist opinion.90
Justice Powell, disenting in Furman,stated that the tests under
the due process clause and the eighth amendment were fundamentally identical, 91 and that a "heavy burden" would rest on those
challenging the statutes "to prove the lack of rational justifications." 92 He added that least restrictive means analysis was inappropriate to review of legislatively enacted criminal penalties. 93
In Gregg and its companion cases, Justice Powell joined in both
Stewart opinions discussed above, taking part in the Stewart-PowellStevens plurality that approved the guided discretion statutes but
struck down the mandatory ones, and that exhibited an unexplained
shift in adjudicatory attitude.9 4 In Coker, Justice Powell voted with
the White plurality, but dissented insofar as the plurality opinion
was "so sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from
creating a narrowly defined substantive crime of aggravated rape
87 Id. 304-05.
88 Id. 304.
89 This departure prompted the pointed criticism by Justice White quoted

infra, note 102.
90 See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.

91408 U.S. at 422 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92 Id. 451. Justice Frankfurter was among the authorities Justice Powell relied
upon in his Furman dissent. Id. 423-24. He cited the use of the due process
standard in Louisiana ex Tel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), where Frankfurter argued that the cruel and unusual
punishments clause ought not be treated as binding upon the states. 408 U.S. at
423-24. Powell stated that the due process rational basis standard was also applied
by the Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), in which an act of Congress

was invalidated, 408 U.S. at 429, 451, although in Trop the Court had said "special
diligence" in judicial scrutiny was appropriate where a "fundamental right" was
at stake. 356 U.S. at 103 (plurality opinion).
93 408 U.S. at 451. See note 83 supra.

9- justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976) (upholding a guided discretion statute with non-jury sentencing). He made
no explicit statement in Proffitt about his adjudicatory attitude.
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punishable by death." 95 He abandoned the deference rhetoric of
his Furman dissent; in fact, he specifically embraced the plurality's
statement that the decision rested ultimately on the Court's "own
judgment." 96
Justice Stevens also joined Justice White's moderately activist
opinion in Coker. Previously, he had joined the two inconsistent
Stewart plurality opinions in Gregg and Woodson. 7 Justice Blackmun joined the plurality opinion in Coker as well, although previously he had found all challenged death penalty statutes to be
constitutional and his adjudicatory attitude had appeared to be
deferential. s
2. Different Standards for Different Cases?
Cases involving the cruel and unusual punishments clause
present two kinds of issues. The first concerns the scope of legis9S433 U.S. at 602 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90 Id. 603 n.2. Powel's position in Coker was viewed by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist as a "disquieting shift" from his earlier position. Id. 607
n.2 (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97
See text accompanying notes 82-89 supra. Justice Stevens announced the
judgment of the Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (a companion case
to Gregg), sustaining a statute that authorized execution for murder whenever the
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed deliberately,
and that "there was a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." Id. 267-68. For
a trenchant critique of this decision see Black Due Process for Death: Jurek- v.
Texas and Companion Cases, 6 CAP. U.L. Rzv. 156 (1976); see also The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, supra note 47, at 70-72. The Jurek decision raises in acute
form the issue whether prediction of future dangerousness is an appropriate basis
for punishment. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of this issue, see
Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for Habitual
or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HAzv. L. REv. 356 (1975).
In Jurek, Justice Stevens did not discuss what standard of review he thought
appropriate to decide cases under the cruel and unusual punishments clause. His
approach was implicitly deferential, however, because having found that consideration of mitigating factors was a constitutionally required guide to jury discretion,
he decided that this requirement was met when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
"indicated" it would interpret the statute so as to allow a defendant to adduce evidence of mitigating circumstances. 428 U.S. at 272-73.
98
Justice Blackmun wrote none of the opinions in Gregg and its companion
cases but he voted to uphold all of the challenged statutes. In Furman, dissenting,
he made a deferential personal statement:
To reverse the judgments in these cases is, of course, the easy choice.
It is easier to strike the balance in favor of life and against death. It is
comforting to relax in the thoughts-perhaps the rationalizations-that this
is the compassionate decision for a maturing society; that this is the moral
and the "right" thing to do...
This, for me, is good argument, and it makes some sense. But it is
good argument and it makes sense only in a legislative and executive way
and not as a judicial expedient.
408 U.S. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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lative power and judicial or administrative discretion pursuant to
that power (what the government may do and how it may do it).89
The second concerns the propriety and weight of evidence and
arguments presented to a court in deciding challenges to the exercise
of that power or discretion. The confusion and lack of principled
articulation evidenced in recent Supreme Court cases with respect
to the latter is related to confusion about the former. The tendency
on the part of some of the Justices to transplant various due
process 100 or equal protection 101 patterns of review to the cruel and
unusual punishments clause reflects incomplete development of
judicial theory with respect to how the clause limits the scope of
permissible government action in the realm of criminal punishment.
The failure to articulate reasons for adopting a particular adjudicatory attitude risks unprincipled decisionmaking. It may be
true, as Justice White thought, that a sub silentio shift in standard
of review led to upholding the death penalty under guided discretion statutes while striking it down under mandatory ones. 10 2 It
99 The "what" and "how" (goals and means) of state action are perhaps never
really separable. This is a cogent criticism of any theory of review that demands
classifying state actions as one or the other. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking,
55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 207-15 (1976). The coalescence of goals and means is particularly clear in the context of substantive analysis of the cruel and unusual punishments clause. It is implicit in the Court's incorporation of procedural considerations
into the notion of "cruelty," see text accompanying notes 21-23 supra, as well as
in its use of the concept of excessiveness as a measure of cruelty, see note 7 & text
accompanying notes 78-80 supra; text accompanying notes 213-16 infra.
100 See, e.g., note 92 & text accompanying notes 91-93 supra. There is nothing
inherently wrong with finding a due process component in the cruel and unusual
punishments clause. It certainly could be considered "cruel" for the government
to inflict punishment on someone without adhering to that fundamental fairness
which is the basis of due process. In certain circumstances, a lack of due process
and the presence of cruelty may present alternative grounds for reaching the same
result. Compare Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (conviction without
evidence of guilt held denial of due process) with Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962) (punishment based on narcotic addict status without any evidence of
use or possession within the state held cruel and unusual punishment).
101 See, e.g., note 67 supra. There is also nothing inherently wrong with finding
an equal protection component in the cruel and unusual punishments clause. It
certainly could be considered cruel for the government to punish A more severely
than B based on factors wholly extrinsic to acceptable penological goals and/or the
nature and circumstances of their crimes. In another guise, in fact, an aspect of
equal protection analysis figures in Type 2 proportionality cases. An argument
can be made that it is cruel to punish A for crime X more severely than B, who
committed crime Y, when X is not a more serious crime than Y under whatever
criteria are used in determining the severity of crimes. See generally text accompanying notes 264-68 infra.
102 Indeed, the more fundamental objection than the plurality's muddled
reasoning is that in Gregg . . . it lectures us at length about the role and
place of the judiciary and then proceeds to ignore its own advice, the net
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is apparent, however, that the difficulty the Justices have had in
articulating an appropriate standard of review in eighth amendment
cases is not attributable alone to their borrowing from other areas
of constitutional inquiry. The principal difficulty (and probably
the reason for their inconsistency) is that no one "test" seems to
fit all types of cases that can arise under the clause.
For example, one shrinks from the idea that the state may take
someone's life or perform a lobotomy merely because this method
accomplishes a social goal which the judges deem beyond judicial
question in a manner that does not appear to them to be patently
irrational. At the same time, one finds equally unacceptable the
notion that the state must prove that five years of imprisonment for
assault, rather than ten or two, is the precisely appropriate punishment for that crime given the state's penological goals, the propriety
of which the judges may subject to proof. It seems still worse to
allow the state to validate a punishment by proving its imposition
necessary for a worthy social goal. For the state might have a
rational basis for concluding, in certain circumstances, that torture
is a necessary punishment. Torture might appear to be the only
punishment that would force spies to reveal what secrets they had
transmitted to an enemy; or the members of the legislature might
rationally believe, perhaps as the result of a public opinion poll,
that mob violence would erupt and citizens would storm the prison
unless it authorized torture as punishment for the perpetrators of
particularly heinous murders. Assuming we agree that what the
state is doing is really definable as torture, our intuitive response
is that torture is exactly what the clause prohibits. No rational
basis nor even a compelling governmental interest could justify such
a punishment. The case would be comparable to a first amendment
challenge to a law providing that no one shall speak in favor of the
Republican Party at a public meeting.
Those who shrink from the "patently irrational" test where
sentences of execution or lobotomy are involved might argue, along
the lines of Justice Brennan,'10 3 that in order to uphold the statute
the state should be required to prove (a) that the punishment is not
assimilable to the core cases of torture and gross excessiveness, and
effect being to suggest that observers of this institution should pay more
attention to what we do than what we say.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 363 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White, himself, is not immune from the criticism he leveled at the Gregg plurality,
for his own adjudicatory attitude in cases challenging the death penalty has varied
considerably. See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra.
103 See text accompanying notes 67-74 supra.
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(b) that the state has important and constitutionally permissible
social goals that are furthered by the punishment, which (c) cannot
be .furthered by a punishment less drastic and irrevocable. Or,
taking a less extreme position, those who shrink from the "patently
irrational" test might argue, along the lines of Justice Marshall, 1e
that in order to accomplish the invalidation of a statute the challenger should be permitted to prove that any one of the above conditions is absent.
Several Justices of the Supreme Court, however, have consistently or intermittently adopted a deferential attitude that rules
out or strictly limits all inquiries of the "(b)" and "(c)" variety.10 5
In so doing, they appear to have been motivated by concerns about
the implications of stricter scrutiny for the other kind of situation
sketched out above, involving the appropriate length of sentence for
assault. Thus, Chief Justice Burger has stated:
If it were proper to put the States to the test of demonstrating the deterrent value of capital punishment, we
could just as well ask them to prove the need for life
imprisonment or any other punishment. Yet I know of no
convincing evidence that life imprisonment is a more
effective deterrent than 20 years' imprisonment, or even that
a $10 parking ticket is a more effective deterrent than a $5
parking ticket.l cs
Burger's concern about the slippery slope assumes that the level of
scrutiny for all eighth amendment challenges ought to be the same.
It may make sense to conclude that a deferential standard of
review ought to apply to run-of-the-mill prison sentences and parking tickets. The length (or range) of appropriate prison sentences
for defined crimes has historically been considered a matter of state
legislative policy and prerogative. If, however, one subscribes to
the notion that the same standard of scrutiny must apply in all
cases, review of execution, lobotomy or "necessary" torture will be
rendered meaningless in the name of consistency. But the notion
104 See text accompanying notes 75-80 supra.
105 See text accompanying notes 58, 60-65, 82-83 & 92-93 supra (summarizing
the views of Justice White, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart
and Powell).
As noted earlier, the "(b)" and "(c)" inquiries are not analytically distinct,
see note 99 supra; nor are they distinct from the "(a)" inquiry in the context of
the cruel and unusual punishments clause. The "(a)" question presents the merits
of the constitutional issue and may be the only question the Court is truly competent
to decide. The problem then becomes whether the Court can properly decide it
without inquiring into the issues presented by "(b)" and "(c)."
106 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 396 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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that the same standard of scrutiny must apply in all cases is wrong.
Even Chief Justice Burger, who purports to apply the rational basis
standard to all cases, must be thinking primarily in terms of Types
1 and 2 (Means of Punishment and Proportionality), and additionally assuming that the challenged punishments are not equivalent to torture. (Surely if a Type 1 statute authorizing drawing
and quartering came before the Court, Burger would not pause to
ask whether the legislature might rationally have thought that it
furthered a legitimate social goal.) In Type 4 cases the Court has
exhibited no marked tendency to defer to prison officials' judgments
on how best to run prisons. 107 The Court has not in fact applied
one standard to all cases, nor should it. The slippery slope concern
will evaporate when consistent principles are articulated to justify
varying adjudicatory attitudes.
3. The Two-Tier Approach
Having concluded that a single adjudicatory attitude is inappropriate for all eighth amendment cases, one may inquire
whether borrowing the traditional two-tiered analysis invoked in
substantive due process and equal protection cases 108 will solve the
problem posed by disparate types of cruel punishment claims.
Some courts and commentators have thought so. 10 9 Chief Justice
Tauro, invalidating the death penalty in Massachusetts, adopted
the "compelling state interest and least restrictive means test." 110
107 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (concluding that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain' . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment"). In
the Estelle opinion one finds no impassioned pleas (nor, indeed, any discussion of
the idea) that the judges ought to defer to official judgment on what constitutes
"minimal standards" for prison medical care. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter,
objected to any implication that the "deliberate indifference" standard required a
finding that prison authorities acted with evil intent. Id. 116-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded
Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HAv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 367 (1977). See
also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 407 (Blaclanun, J.,dissenting) (drawing a
distinction between the propriety of reviewing punishment imposed by the prison
system and punishment authorized by the legislature).
108 See notes 50-51 supra.
109 See Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,
83 HAnv. L. REv. 1773, 1796-97 (1970); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86
HAnv. L. PlEv. 50, 82-83 (1972); Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CAIw.
L. Bur. 1268, 1353-54 (1968). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 n.34
(Brennan, J., concurring) (collecting cases that indicate a stricter scrutiny is appropriate in reviewing death sentences).
1 0 Commonwealth v. O'Neal, - Mass. _, 339 N.E.2d 676, 678-79 (1975).
"Thus, in order for the State to allow the taking of life by legislative mandate it
must demonstrate that such action is the least restrictive means toward furtherance
of a compelling governmental end." Id.
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Although he presumed the state's interest in "ensuring justice and
maintaining the social compact" to be "compelling," the state was
unable to prove that capital punishment was the least restrictive
means toward accomplishing its goals of providing the "right"
amount of deterrence, incapacitation and retribution.'
It is clear that once a court adopts the least restrictive means
requirement, and places the burden of proof on the states, a constitutional challenge to any criminal punishment will probably succeed. This was the very concern Chief Justice Burger expressed in
the words quoted above. 112 To avoid such a result, the death
penalty must be placed on the upper tier of scrutiny, and imprisonment on the lower; but what are the principles which dictate that
placement? Chief Justice Tauro stated that "[t]here is little doubt
that life is a fundamental right," 113 and the "fundamental right"
formulation triggered his application of strict scrutiny.
One thesis of this Article is that the fundamental rights approach is basically sound. That is, it is appropriate for a court to
consider the fundamental nature of an interest invaded by punishment in determining the standards by which the constitutionality
of imposing that punishment will be decided. Nonetheless, there
are two arguments that might be advanced against using the
fundamental rights approach. The first is that a person convicted
of crime does not possess fundamental rights in the same sense as
the rest of us. 1 4 This argument begs the question. By definition
the convicted person no longer possesses any rights that the state
may legitimately extinguish. But the eighth amendment limits
permissible punishment; that is, it establishes limits on the state's
authority to invade personal interests in order to punish. It recognizes rights in convicted persons. In trying to determine what
interests the state may invade to punish, and to what extent, the
strength of the individual's interests vis-4-vis the strength of the
government's justification for invading that interest rather than a
"M

Id. at

-,

339 N.E.2d at 686-87.

112 See text accompanying note 106 supra.
-113
Mass. at _ 339 N.E.2d at 678.
114 Although the Supreme Court has not held that prisoners possess exactly
the same constitutional rights as other people, see, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners'
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) ("the needs of penal institutions
impose limitations on constitutional rights"), it is clear that at least certain rights
held to be fundamental in our society are also possessed by prisoners. E.g., Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) (fourteenth amendment right to be free of racial discrimination); see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Runnes v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974).
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less fundamental one must be evaluated. Although such a judgment
is related to the merits of an eighth amendment or due process
claim, it is also a relevant inquiry at the threshold stage of choosing
the standard of review. There is a prima facie case for taking a
very close look at the validity of the government's justification when
it proposes to punish a person by invading a very strong individual
interest. Therefore, to determine what invasions of individual
interests of convicted persons should trigger strict scrutiny, one
must ask what interests are fundamental to all of us, criminals and
non-criminals alike.
The second argument against the fundamental rights approach
is based on its disparate treatment of life and liberty. If one concedes that the state's decisions to punish people by depriving them
of liberty need not be reviewed on the upper tier, why should the
state's decisions to punish people by depriving them of life be
strictly scrutinized? One way to resolve this problem is simply not
to make this concession, and some commentators have argued that
the state's decisions to impose imprisonment ought to be subject to
a form of strict scrutiny.115 Another solution would be to say that
life is simply a much stronger interest than personal liberty; in the
"life, liberty and property" triad it is on a plane by itself."16 It is
perhaps true that survival is the dominant interest of most human
beings, and, of course, life is the sine qua non of all individual
rights because they all presuppose a living person as their holder.
Nonetheless, a satisfactory answer to the life/liberty criticism
must recognize that certain liberty interests are indeed fundamental.
"Liberty," defined as freedom from governmental coercion to do,
or to refrain from doing, anything other than what one chooses, is
not a fundamental right at all."17 Yet "liberty," more narrowly defined as the freedom from governmental restraint on physical movement and choice of environment, has consistently been treated as a
fundamental individual right."18 The panoply of procedural safe115 See Singer, Sending Men to Prison: ConstitutionalAspects of the Burden of
Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing
Determinations, 58 CORNExLL L. REv. 51 (1972); Spece, supra note 50.
13. This is the approach taken by Chief Justice Tauro in O'Neal, - Mass. at
339 N.E.2d at 691.
117 It is obvious that one of the basic purposes of government must be to
regulate individual liberty for the benefit of society as a whole. See J. S. MML,
ON LmlRTY 3-6, 95-118 (A. Castell ed. 1947). Cf. R.Dwoxn, TAINGRiGErrs
SEIousLY 269-72 (1977) (discussing liberty and social regulation).
8
" The fundamental nature of the right to freedom from confinement is
demonstrated by the inclusion of "liberty" in the fifth and fourteenth amendment
due process clauses, as well as by the guarantee of habeas corpus. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cL 2. The right to travel has also been held to be fundamental, demon-
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guards required by the Bill of Rights, many of which have been
deemed fundamental,- 9 reflects societal commitment to the fundamentality of the right to freedom from physical restraint absent
justification. 20 If procedural safeguards are fundamental, then
a fortiori the underlying freedom from physical restraint that they
protect must be so. Of course, the seriousness or extent of the
governmental invasion of this right varies as prison sentences increase; one year in prison is a greater invasion than one day.
It is appropriate, therefore, to inquire whether or not a fundamental right is at stake when determining how rigorous an
adjudicatory attitude a court should adopt toward the government's
justification for imposing a given punishment. The rhetoric of
two-tier analysis contributes this much that is useful. But it is also
appropriate to inquire into how fundamental the right invaded by
the state's action is, and into the seriousness or extent of the invasion. This conclusion may imply that review of a death sentence
is governed by the compelling state interest/least restrictive means
test. But it does not imply that rational basis deference is necessarily appropriate in reviewing all prison sentences; for example,
rational basis deference is not appropriate in the review of a
sentence of life imprisonment for possession of one marijuana
cigarette. There is no more logical justification for using two
stylized postures of review than for using only one.
B. Toward a Theory of Review Under the Clause
It is possible that the rhetoric of adjudicatory attitudes is a
mode of rationalization for decisions made on other, partly inarticulate grounds. It is also possible that that rhetoric is a useful
conceptual tool that can help clarify or sort issues for principled
strating that the fundamentality of physical freedom is not restricted to the context
of improper imprisonment. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378

U.S.

so (1964).

119 Most of the rights guaranteed by the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments
have been incorporated by the fourteenth amendment due process clause because
they are "fundamental." See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(right to jury trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against selfincrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
120 Their fundamentality may also be thought to derive from the right of persons
to be treated by the government with equal concern and respect. See R. DwoRmN,
supra note 117, at 273; Baker, Utility and Rights: Two Justifications for State
Action Increasing Equality, 84 YALE L.J. 39 (1974). But the reason concern and
respect imply observance of procedural safeguards may be that physical restraint
is a severe invasion of personhood, which seems equivalent to saying that freedom
from physical restraint is a fundamental personal interest.
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decisionmaking. The latter may be true without formulating a
simplistic dichotomy between standards of review and substantive
standards and without taking the implausible view that adjudication
is a linear process consisting of two temporal stages-first the selection of a posture, then the decision on the merits.
But if standards of review are to function as a tool for principled decisionmaking rather than as a smokescreen for holdings
based on unarticulated rationales, then it is at least necessary to
articulate principles that will show why a certain adjudicatory
attitude is appropriate in a certain case. What follows is an initial
attempt to formulate such principles in the context of cases arising
under the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
1. The Principle of Risk of Error
There is a difference between deciding principles of justice or
fairness in the abstract and deciding how to achieve justice or fairness in concrete situations, given the limitations of human perceptions and institutions.' 21 I take it as an undisputed principle
that human perceptions and experiences are limited and that human
decisions are fallible, and that this is no less true when humans
attempt to implement their conceptions of what is ideal, desirable,
appropriate or fair. If one believes that there are objective right
answers in the abstract, human fallibility dictates that some decisions made in the concrete will be wrong; they are subject to a
risk of error. If one holds that there are no right answers, then
121 This difference may be identical to Bawls' distinction between "ideal" and
"nonideal" theories, or between "strict compliance" and "partial compliance"
theories. See J. PAwLs, A THEoRY OF JUMsCE 243-51 (1971).
The intuitive idea is to split the theory of justice into two parts. The
first or ideal part assumes strict compliance and works out the principles
that characterize a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances. It
develops the conception of a perfectly just basic structure . . . . Nonideal
theory, the second part, is worked out after an ideal conception of justice
has been chosen; only then do the parties ask which principles to adopt
under less happy conditions.
Id. 245-46. It is under nonideal theory that Rawls would place consideration of
the "constraints [which] arise from the permanent conditions of human life" and
"historical contingencies." Id. 246. The thrust of the argument presented herein
is that ideal theory-omitting these "constraints"--need not be the place to start
thinking about justice in human institutions. Given these "constraints," there is no
basis for believing that attempts to implement an ideal solution will not result
in greater injustices than the actual implementation of a solution less consonant
with ideal theory. Put another way, our "ideals" ought not to be constituted by
ignoring our "constraints." (This skepticism is analogous to doubts about the
capability of economic theory to describe real-world optimal resource allocation
in light of the so-called "Theory of the Second-Best." See Lipsey & Lancaster,
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. EcoN. SruDrEs 11 (1956).)
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decisions can never be objectively wrong although some will inevitably be inconsistent with prior results; they are subject to a
risk of arbitrariness.u2
Most who philosophize about fairness or justice take into account the inherent fallibility of human perceptions and institutions
at some point in their theories. Crucial differences between their
approaches often depend upon the point in their theories at which a
risk of error or risk of arbitrariness principle is taken into account.
At the heart of our legal system, and for that matter our moral
system, is the principle of formal equality: we ought to treat like
cases alike and we ought to treat relevantly different cases differently. At some point in any legal theory, and the point will
vary, we must take into account the inability of human institutions
always to discern properly the relevant differences. For example,
consider the practice of indeterminate sentencing. Those who
would defend it might argue that it enables the criminal justice
system to consider individual differences among crimes and criminals, and thereby to treat all criminals more fairly. Those who
would condemn the practice would not fault this argument in the
abstract, but might argue instead that society does not possess and
is not capable of designing institutions that can discern these relevant differences consistently. Therefore, opponents of indeterminacy argue that regardless of what might be considered fair to
individuals in the abstract, we can achieve fairer treatment in practice if determinate punishment is consistently applied to whole
123
classes of criminals.
As another example, consider the idea that all offenders ought
to be treated rather than punished. 124 In the abstract the idea seems
humane; however, it necessarily presupposes that sociological and
psychiatric knowledge is complete enough, and therapeutic technology accurate enough, to accomplish the results that the therapists
intend. The theory assumes as well that each individual therapist
can fully implement that knowledge and technology. These
assumptions would be questioned by many who consider existing
knowledge to be impressionistic and scanty and existing therapies to
be frequently counterproductive and misguided. (The theory also
See note 130 infra.
See generally Alsehuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 550 (1978) (presenting the opposing arguments and criticizing the efficacy
of determinate sentencing).
124 This idea is most often associated with Lady Barbara Wootton. See, e.g.,
B. WoorroN, (mu
AD = CTImmAL LAW (1963).
122
123
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necessarily presupposes that it is morally justifiable for therapists to
alter personalities in ways other than those that the people subjected to treatment choose. This presupposition has been emphatically denied by those who argue that people have a right to
live under a punishment system rather than a treatment system.) 125
Considering such human limitations, it is not surprising that
the error principle figures prominently, though implicitly, in accepted principles of adjudication. When a hard case comes before
a court, there either exists a single correct decision dictated by the
totality of our laws and institutions, or there does not. If there is a
right answer, there is no guarantee that the judge will decide the
case correctly because courts, like all human institutions, are fallible.
Principles of adjudication, however, ought to tell the judge on
which side she should choose to risk error. A prima facie application
of the error principle determines the judge's standard of review or
level of scrutiny; the error principle also figures in deciding the
case for one side or the other on the merits.
There are two aspects of the risk of error principle: the first
relates to the likelihood of error, the second to the cost or gravity
of error. In cases where the likelihood of error can be estimated,
principles of adjudication tell the trier to choose the side where
error is less likely. The "preponderance of the evidence test," for
example, is a principle of adjudication relating to the likelihood of
error. If the trier thinks fact X is more likely to be true than not,
then she is to decide X is true, even though this decision is quite
possibly wrong.
The second aspect of the principle, the cost or gravity of error,
is of greater importance to the present discussion. It is relevant
both in judging how much less a likelihood of error the trier should
demand on one side of the case before deciding for that side, and
in selecting a result in cases where it is not possible to tell how the
risk of error is distributed. Considerations of gravity also dictate
that a trier ought to risk error in favor of the side presenting
stronger interests which would be infringed if the decision wrongly
went against that side, and do so even in some cases where the likelihood of error favors the opposite side. Because fundamental
individual rights are considered very strong interests, courts will
normally prefer to risk error in favor of the individual claiming such
a right.120 This principle is manifested in the presumption that accused persons are innocent until proven guilty and the requirement
See Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Tim MoNiST 475 (1968).
6 See notes 118-20 & accompanying text supra.
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that guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt, even where it is
more likely than not that the accused is guilty.12 7 The same principle underlies the first amendment "chilling effects" doctrine: it is
preferable to risk allowing some "unprotected" speech to take place
than to risk curtailing the individual's right to speak. 12 On the
level of standards of review, this aspect of the error principle is the
basis of the strict scrutiny doctrine.
The argument presented here may be reduced to the idea that
the propriety of a standard of review should be governed by one
question: Assuming that no court can decide all cases correctly, on
which side is it preferable to risk error? In a case involving indi127 See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 494 (1972)
(Brennan, J.,dissenting); In -re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-72 (1970) (Harlan, J.,concurring).
In Winship Justice Harlan stated:
[Elven though the labels used for alternative standards of proof are vague
and not a very sure guide to decisionmaking, the choice of the standard
for a particular variety of adjudication does, I think, reflect a very fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual
determinations.
... [A] standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should
have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication ....

In a criminal case . . . we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting
someone who is guilty....
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a
criminal defendant his ]iberty-[the] margin of error [in factfinding]
is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden . . .of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial
of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
a . . I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our
society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.
397 U.S. at 369-72 (citation omitted). In Justice Brennan's dissent in Lego v.
Twomey, he stated:
If we permit the prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that a confession was voluntary, then .. .we must be prepared
to justify the view that it is no more serious in general to admit involuntary confessions than it is to exclude voluntary confession ....
Compelled self-incrimination is so alien to the American sense of justice
that I see no way that such a view could ever be justified.
404 U.S. at 494. See Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YArx L.J. 1299 (1977).
Although beyond the scope of the present article, it would clearly be fruitfud
to apply the risk of error principle to the doctrine of harmless constitutional error.
See generally Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional ErrorA Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1976); Satzburg, The
Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. R3Ev. 988 (1973).
128 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 H.Anv. L. lEv. 844, 852-58 (1970).
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vidual interests, if it is preferable to risk error on the side of the
government, then a deferential stance is proper; if it is preferable
to risk error on the side of the individual, then an activist stance is
called for. Contrary to the apparent views of Justice Rehnquist 129
it is not always preferable to risk error on the side of the government. Rather, the question must be considered in the light of
principles of justice and fairness. When crucial individual interests
are at stake, many of which are enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
our system recognizes that it is often better to risk error on the side
of the individual. Given that prima facie recognition, the extent
to which error on the side of the individual should be risked may,
in cases where the gravity factor is not peremptory, depend on the
demonstrable strength and certainty of the countervailing governmental interests. This appears to be the kernel of the compelling
state interest doctrine.
The effect of the error principle 130 is most obvious with respect
to the question of properly allocating the burden of persuasion on
relevant substantive issues. It dictates placing the burden of persuasion on that party against whom it is more preferable to risk
error. With respect to the more complex question of adjudicatory
attitude, the error principle leads to a spectrum theory of adjudication rather than to the two-tier approach. This follows from the
potentially infinite variations in the two determinative aspects of
the principle, the likelihood of error, and the gravity of error. Considering the gravity aspect of risk of error, there is always an interest
in letting the judgment of a legislature stand. (We might say there
is a prima facie duty to respect majority rule.) The extent to which
a judge is predisposed to favor this interest by adopting a deferential
stance should depend upon the risk of error posed by a decision
129 See

text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.

Although this Article argues in terms of a risk of error principle rather than
a risk of arbitrariness principle, its conclusions do not seem to depend upon the
existence of objective right answers. Ronald Dworkin's claim that a right answer
does exist in every case (even though the court may not discern it) has attracted
a recent flurry of commentary. See R. Dwomnxr, supra note 117, at 81-130.
130

Critiques of Dworkin's view are contained in Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits
of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972); Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation,
8 A . PHL. Q. 151 (1971); Note, Dworkin's "Rights Thesis," 74 MICH. L. REV.

1167 (1976). If one assumes, as does Hart, that in a hard case there exists no
right answer, but only the judge's discretion, see H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAw 123-50 (1961), then a modified risk analysis by which one seeks to minimize
results unjustifiably inconsistent with results in "like" cases is appropriate.

It is

then preferable to risk arbitrariness in favor of the side for which a decision is less
likely to be arbitrary or, when the likelihood of arbitrariness cannot be determined,
in favor of the side for which an adverse decision would infringe upon stronger
(and/or more certain) interests.
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adverse to the interests of the individual challenger.1 81 The next
section will examine the factors relevant to risk of error analysis in
the eighth amendment context.
2. Relevant Factors for Allocating Risk of Error
Although no systematic risk of error analysis appears in the
cruel and unusual punishments clause case law, a number of factors
that have figured in the Court's discussions provide the starting
point for such an analysis. Irrevocability is one such factor.
Sterilization, lobotomy, and death are all irreversible, and the
government cannot cancel or even ameliorate the effects of such
actions should they be wrongly imposed as punishment. Irrevocability strongly calls for strict scrutiny, 32 as Justices Marshall
and Brennan explicitly recognized in the death penalty cases. 133
Though irrevocability was not cited as a principle explicitly calling
for strict scrutiny by Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens, its pres131 There may be some categories of individual interests so strong that the
cost of error analysis will be peremptory. For instance, if the individual right to
freedom of speech were such a strong interest, then the "chilling effects" doctrine
would be formulated so stringently that courts would decide in favor of individuals
engaging in speech even if the risk of curtailing protected speech flowing from the
challenged governmental regulation was very slight when compared with the risk
of curtailing the government's permissible objectives. On the prima facie level of
selecting a standard of review, the doctrine would require that, even if the governmental justification appeared strong and certain, and the harm to individuals
speculative, the government be put to its proof.
132 Of course, even one day in prison is irrevocable in the sense that all past
events and their resultant effects on human beings are irrevocable. Yet, although
it might be difficult to articulate, most people intuitively recognize a distinction
betveen the irrevocability of everything and the irrevocability of death or mutilation.
The latter is the strong sense of irrevocability referred to here. It encompasses
irreversible deprivations of attributes or capacities essential to, or at least closely
connected with, complete peisonhood. At a minimum, it encompasses irreversible
deprivations of certain physical or mental functions included in our stereotype of a
person. Someone who has had her hands cut off for stealing does not thereby
cease to be a complete person; yet when one thinks of what a person is, surely the
stereotype has hands. The point at which the strong sense of irrevocability blends
into the irrevocability of everything is unclear. Imprisonment will not be considered
irrevocable in the strong sense because a prisoner can think, write, talk, feel and
may someday be released. Yet if it were possible to give someone a pill that
instantly induced in her the physical and mental effects of having spent a lifetime
in a cell, an irrevocable deprivation in the strong sense would probably have taken
place. At any rate, it is the clear cases of irrevocability in the strong sense, of
which death is the clearest, that give rise to its use as a factor in allocating risk
of error in adjudication. Incidentally, because this strong sense of irrevocability
is derived from attributes and capacities important to personhood, this factor overlaps with an error analysis based on the fundamental nature of individual rights.
See text accompanying notes 108-20 supra.
133See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. 346 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Commonwealth v. O'Neal,
-

Mass. _

339 N.E.2d 676, 678 n.2 (1975).
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ence had a similar effect in their plurality opinion in Woodson.' w
Because death is final, the Woodson Court constitutionally required
that the death penalty may be imposed only if certain procedures

are followed:
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year
or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a

corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment
35
in a specific case.1

Irrevocability has led courts to adopt strict scrutiny in cases
presenting other legal and factual issues. 1 6 The gravamen of irrevocability analysis is that all human judgments are fallible. When
deprivation is visited on an individual in the name of the government because it is thought just, it is always possible that more facts
will be discovered or prevailing patterns of thought will change,
and that the deprivation will later be thought unjust. In those
cases the long-run viability of the system would be enhanced if the
deprivation could be undone or mitigated. 3 7 Because irrevocable
134

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).

'35 Id. 305.
136 See, e.g.,

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); In re Karen
Quinan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (dealing extensively with the irrevocability of the consequences of disconnecting life support apparatus).
137 Instances of later-discovered factual error in the criminal justice system
abound. Studies of the frequency of such errors, for example, cases in which an
innocent person was punished for a crime later confessed to by another, are cited
by Justice Marshall in Furman. 408 U.S. at 366 n.156 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Prevailing thoughts about what is considered just may also change over time.
See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Sometimes these changes are reflected in new interpretations
of the Constitution. A famous example is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), incorporating the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings. It may
be considered an affirmation of our constitutional system that Gideon was found
innocent upon retrial with the assistance of counsel See A. LEWis, GIDEoN's
TRUmPET 223-38 (1964). As part of his argument against the death penalty, former justice Goldberg has pointed out, by inviting comparison of Williams v.
Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955), With Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), that execution forecloses completion of this constitutional social expiation process. In both
Williams and Nola defendants convicted of first degree murder had failed to raise
claims challenging the constitutionality of their convictions. Noia was sentenced to
life imprisonment and was later freed when the Court permitted collateral attack
on his conviction. Williams' conviction was also constitutionally deficient but collateral attack was preempted because he had been sentenced to death and executed.
See Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 AnRz. L. REV. 355,
362 n.35 (1973).
Important changes in societal values concerning justice are not always reflected
in constitutional decisions; nonetheless, they may cause earlier, and now irrevocable,
actions of the legal system to be heartily regretted. As an example, consider the
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deprivations cannot be undone or mitigated it is appropriate to
weigh and consider them with the utmost care in the first instance.
There may be a category of individual interests that are so vital
that even the utmost care is not sufficient to protect them from
possibly erroneous irrevocable government invasions, regardless of
what competing governmental interests are at stake. Charles L.
Black has argued that life is such an interest. 138 Rejecting the death
penalty on acount of the inherent residual risks in our system of
justice does not imply, of course, that our system of justice is too
risky to impose lesser punishments. Yet in Gregg v. Georgia,
Justice White referred to this argument as "an indictment of our
entire system of justice," which "cannot be accepted as a proposition
of constitutional law." -19 The Black argument, if accepted, can be
limited as a proposition of constitutional law to instances in which
life is at stake. It is an indictment of our entire system of justice
only in the sense that it accuses our system of being fallible to some
degree. Such an indictment cannot be denied. Against this, however, it may be contended that the death penalty serves to further
the same interest in preserving life.140 An appropriate response to
this deterrence defense is that in this case, and perhaps in this case
only, it is proper to require the government to prove that the death
penalty does save lives. If the nature of the case is such that it can141
not be proven, then the government must relinquish its claim.
extraordinary proclamation issued by the Governor of Massachusetts on July 19,
1977, which stated, in part:
WHEEA-s: [The people of Massachusetts] recognize that all human
institutions are imperfect, that the possibility of injustice is ever-present,
and that the acknowledgment of fault, combined with a resolve to do
better, are signs of strength in a free society ....
Now, THEREFORE, I, Michael S. Dukakis, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts . . . do hereby proclaim Tuesday, August 23,
1977, "Nico A SAcco AND BARTOLOmEO VANzETTI ME ORrA. DAY"; and
declare, further, that any stigma and disgrace should be forever removed
from the names of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti . . . and so,
from the name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ....
See N.Y. Times, July 20, 1977, at 18.

138C.

BLACK,

CAPrrAL PUNIS ME NT: THE INEVITABIr

Y

OF CAPRICE

AND

MISTAKE (1974).

139428 U.S. at 226 (White, J., concurring); see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 348-49 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
140See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 616 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[olur concern for human life must not be confined to the guilty");
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 355 (White, J., dissenting) (mandatory death
penalty statutes are "solemn judgments, reasonably based, that imposition of the
death penalty will save the lives of innocent persons").
141 Even if the deterrence proposition could be proved (leaving aside the
question of how to decide what would constitute proof), the death penalty would
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This, as we have seen, was the effect of putting the state to its proof
on the death penalty in Massachusetts. 1'
The severity (or "enormity") of a punishment is another factor
that suggests the desirability of stricter review.148 This is a measure
of the strength of the individual interest involved, as the extent
of the pain or suffering entailed by the punishment, and the question whether the interest invaded by the punishment is a fundamental right.144 A fundamental rights analysis measures the extent to which the individual interest at stake has been institutionally
identified and protected, perhaps by the Constitution or prior judicial decisions.
Punishments and governmental interests may also have been
institutionally sanctioned, and that factor is likewise relevant to the
risk of error approach to the scrutiny spectrum. Whether or not
the challenge is to a legislative enactment, and whether or not the
punishment is usual are inquiries concerning the extent of this
institutional sanction. A legislative enactment is entitled to more
deference than the act of a sentencing authority or penal official;
if the punishment authorized by the legislature is not unusual (not
atypical) the factor of institutional sanction is weightier still. 14
The presence of these factors would indicate, ceteris paribus, deference for punishments like fines and imprisonment and stricter
scrutiny for punishments like denationalization and making confessional speeches before civic groups. 14 The closeness of a given
punishment to the "core cases" of the clause, which include torture
and (perhaps less clearly) gross excessiveness, 147 is another factor
relevant to the risk of error and to how the judicial system should
respond in the face of that risk. The vagueness and ambiguity of
the concept of cruelty will lead people and judges to adopt varying
not be justified unless this type of utilitarian calculation is accepted as an appropriate justification of punishment. See text accompanying notes 224-56 infra.
142 See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
143 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 286-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
144 Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (expatriation involves the loss
of "the right to have rights").
45
1 See note 8 supra. The unusualness of punishment could be determined
by the rarity of its use in other jurisdictions or in the history of Anglo-American
law.
14 6 In United States v. Blankenheim, as a condition of probation corporate
executives who fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Act were required to
"make an oral presentation before twelve (12) business, civic or other groups about
the circumstances of this case and [their] participation therein." United States v.
Blankenheim, No. CR-74-182-CBR (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 1, 1974) (judgment and
order of probation and fine); see Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YAI.= LJ. 590 (1977).
14 7 See text accompanying notes 163-64 infra.
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notions of what amounts to cruelty. This uncertainty creates a
risk of injustice through arbitrariness. Moreover, the likelihood
and gravity of error both increase as punishments, the-"cruelty" of
which is doubtful, approach the core cases of punishments - forbidden by the eighth amendment. All other things being equal, it
would be better to risk error in favor of the individual who challenges a punishment close to the core cases. For example, this
factor suggests strict scrutiny for punishment (perhaps denominated
aversion therapy) involving the administration of drugs that induce
nausea and terror. The symptoms these drugs produce resemble
the effects of torture.14 s
Another factor related to the meaning of "cruelty," as well as
to the strength of the individual interest at stake, is the degree of
pain caused by a particular punishment, and whether that pain is
measurable or controllable. If the degree of pain is very high, the
punishment may be viewed as "enormous" and a strong individual
interest will have been infringed. 149 If it is not measurable or controllable, then there is a great risk that application of the punishment will be arbitrary, and arbitrary inffiction of punishment is itself
cruel, as the Supreme Court has recognized in its death penalty
decisions. 1 0
In choosing a standard of review one might also consider the
motives of the inflicters of punishment. On the legislative level,
this factor relates to appropriate reasons for punishment, or whether
penological goals further social utility. A statute whose language
avowed (or the circumstances of whose enactment showed) that its
sole aim was to make people suffer should be subject to strict
scrutiny for cruelty. On the administrative level, this factor would
most often require examination of the reasons for prison officials'
acts. Conditions of confinement would come under strict scrutiny
for cruelty under this factor if officials intended to make inmates
suffer. (Conditions of confinement might come under strict scrutiny
for cruelty regardless of official motivation, if they amount to
"enormous" punishment or severe invasion of fundamental rights or
are assimilable to the core cases of cruelty.)
The strength of governmental interests is a broad factor that
comprehends both the social importance of punishment (penological
goals) and the degree of certainty that the goals are being served by a
148 See, e.g., Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (use of
succinyleholine which causes paralyzing fright). See Note, supra note 27, at 897-900.
149 See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra.
150 See text accompanying notes 32-47 supra.
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particular form of punishment. If a challenged punishment closely
serves a permissible social goal, that factor will suggest that deference
to the legislative judgment is indicated. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that when a punishment is challenged the governmental interest in retaining it is the net incremental social benefit
to be derived from using that punishment instead of its next preferred alternative.
3. Applications of the Risk of Error Principle
To summarize the foregoing discussion, the following factors
have been suggested to be relevant to determining the standard of
review for cruel and unusual punishments cases: 111
I. The irrevocability of the punishment;
2. The strength of the individual interest invaded by the
punishment-for example, is it a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution or closely related to a constitutionally protected interest?
3. The "enormity" or severity of the punishment;
4. The nature of the challenged governmental act or authorization, that is, whether it is a legislative enactment, an act
within the discretion of a judicial sentencing authority, or an
act of prison officials;
5. The unusualness of the punishment, that is, has it been
sanctioned in institutional history?
6. The closeness of the punishment to the core cases under
the clause, torture and gross disproportionality;
7. The degree of physical or mental pain imposed by the
punishment and whether it is measurable or controllable;
8. The motives of the inflicters, including the validity of
the enacted penological goals and whether acts of prison officials
were "deliberately" intended to cause suffering; and
9. The strength of the governmental interest claimed to
be furthered by the punishment, comprehending both the social
n51 This list is informal in several respects. It is not exhaustive, nor is each
factor discrete from the others. The listed concerns are part of a cluster that may be
equally well served by other formulations. In addition, factors relating to institutional sanction incorporate past moral judgments made by the legal system, and
hence are not of the same linguistic order as factors calling for present moral judgment, such as the closeness of the challenged punishment to the core cases under
the clause.
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utility of the government's goal and the degree of certainty that
the challenged punishment implements that goal.
All of these factors, except the second, when examined in the
context of challenges to punishment by imprisonment suggest the
need for some degree of deference to the legislative judgment. If
the sentence appears grossly disproportionate, stricter scrutiny may
be called for. 52 Though some may question whether imprisonment
actually serves the goals of rehabilitation or deterrence, it at least
accomplishes the goals of retribution and isolation, which are
usually deemed penologically appropriate. 153 Imprisonment is
neither unusual, irrevocable (in the strong sense) -15 nor enormous;
it has long been sanctioned as a means of punishment, is imposed
pursuant to legislative enactment, and may be controlled in the
extent to which it inflicts pain. Because imprisonment invades a
fundamental right, however, I would argue that least restrictive
means analysis is appropriate when it is challenged, especially if the
interest in freedom from restraint is severely invaded, as it would be
by a long sentence. The standard of review, given the other factors
relevant to the risk of error analysis, should, however, be somewhat
deferential. This may be accomplished by placing the burden of
persuasion as to the least restrictive means issue on the convicted
person challenging the length of her sentence.
Judicially imposed innovative sentences, such as public confession, 55 should probably be subject to a somewhat stricter scrutiny,
perhaps by requiring the government to bear the burden of persuasion on the validity of the goals it seeks to serve. A factor
strongly indicating that it is preferable to risk error on the side of
individual interests z56 in this case is the punishment's "unusualness"; in addition, the sentence lacks legislative authorization, and
1

52

See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.

four theories as the
basis upon which society should act in imposing penalties upon those who
violate its laws. These are: (1) to bring about the reformation of the
evil-doer; (2) to effect retribution or revenge upon him; (3) to restrain
him physically, so as to make it impossible for him to commit further
crimes; and (4) to deter others from similarly violating the law.
See generally
Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285, 289-90 (1930).
S. KADisH & M. PAUrLSEN, CnnmrnAL LAw A" ITs POcESsES 1-39 (2d ed. 1975)
(collecting cases and commentaries).
54
3 See note 132 supra.
155 See note 146 supra.
156 There is a paradox in speaking of the risk of error "favoring the individual"
in cases in which a specific individual prefers the challenged punishment to what
would otherwise be the alternative. Price-fixers may prefer confessional speeches
to prison; Gary Gilmore preferred death to life imprisonment. See note 224 infra.
153 Generally speaking, there have been advanced
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the claim that such sentences implement the goals of punishment
may be considered speculative. On the other hand, supporters of
such a sentence may claim that it has unique social value in effecting
better general deterrence while sparing offenders the harshness of
imprisonment; in addition, the sentence is neither irrevocable nor
enormous. Of course, if an innovative punishment seems grossly
disproportionate, humiliating or degrading, it would be subject to
very strict scrutiny because of its closeness to the core cases under
the clause.
In the case of the death penalty, the strongest factors in support
of risking error on the side of the individual are irrevocability,
enormity, and the strength of the fundamental individual interest
in survival. The strongest factors that support placing the risk of
error on the side of the government are those involving institutional sanction-the death penalty has been enacted by many
state legislatures and it has a long history in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The state interest in the social goals of deterring murder
and/or exacting retribution should not weigh heavily in this
calculus, because of the relatively insignificant, if any, net incremental benefits provided by execution as opposed to life imprisonment. Incremental gains in deterrence and retribution must
also be weighed against the extra quantum of social harm, if any,
1
attributable to the existence of the death penalty. 5
The death penalty is not prima facie assimilable to the core
cases of cruelty. Substantive analysis must inquire whether, on
reflection, it should nevertheless be considered cruel. In that
analysis should it be presumed that past institutional judgments
were correct? 158 The conjunction of the factors of irrevocability,
enormity, and fundamental right peculiar to the death penalty
demands a searching analysis with no initial presumptions in favor
Does the eighth amendment "protect" an individual from the infliction of a certain
punishment when, given the circumstances, she would choose it if she could? At
present I have no satisfactory answer to the question whether one can consent to
the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. The answer probably depends
upon whether the problem is looked at from the point of view of the specific
individual (subjective) interest or from the point of view of the collective interest
in protecting the generalized individual interest in freedom from degradation at the
hands of the government. See text accompanying notes 238-40 infra. If one
adheres to the collectivist viewpoint, the government cannot inflict a degrading
punishment even if the individual either does not view it as degrading or she
desires degradation in light of the alternatives. If the question is evaluated from
the individualist viewpoint, this seems both paternalistic and unfair.
157 See note 255 infra.
153 See note 151 supra.
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of the past.6 9 The death penalty should be subject to strict
scrutiny for cruelty.

IV. THE

SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD

The lack of consensus regarding the level of judicial scrutiny
applicable to the cruel and unusual punishments clause is arguably
a symptom of a more fundamental conflict over the substantive
meaning of the clause, as has been suggested earlier. 60 The concept of cruelty poses analytical difficulties on two levels. First,
there is an underlying hesitancy on the part of at least one member
of the Court to "rewrite" the Constitution by interpreting the
clause via evolving standards. Second, even if an evolving or
variable approach to the clause is accepted, there is additional disagreement over whether objective indicators of public sentiment, or
the judges' own moral insights, or other principles are the proper
tools to decide what is cruel under the clause.
Part IV reviews the major approaches to the clause proposed
by the Justices of the present Court and analyzes the problems presented by various methods of interpretation. Consideration of these
problems leads to the conclusion that it is appropriate to determine
the clause's substantive meaning on the basis of accepted philosophical justifications for punishment when these are seen in their relationship to a moral consensus on what is cruel.
A. Fixed and Variable Meaning Alternatives
There is a fixed or historical interpretation of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause which holds that the clause proscribes
only punishments thought cruel in 1789. One recent proponent
of this view was the late Justice Black. 6 1 On the present Court,
162
Justice Rehnquist is the only avowed adherent.
159 Past judgments will figure in the substantive analysis because whether something has been thought cruel in the past is relevant to whether it is cruel today.
160 See text accompanying notes 99-102 supra.
61
1 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 225-26 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). Black's articulation of the historical approach to the claim that the death
penalty was cruel and unusual was as follows:
In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment
because that penalty was in common use and authorized by law here and in
the countries from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment
was adopted. It is inconceivable to me that the framers intended to end
capital punishment by the Amendment. Although some people have urged
that this Court should amend the Constitution by interpretation to keep it
abreast of modem ideas, I have never believed that lifetime judges in our
system have any such legislative power.
Id. 226.
162 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308 (1976) (Relnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist rejects the "evolving standards of decency" approach
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It is widely accepted that the Framers' major reason for the
inclusion of the clause in the Bill of Rights was to prohibit the
infamous tortures used during the Stuart reign in England, such as
the thumbscrew and the rack. 16 3 These methods of punishment
have been referred to herein as core cases under the clause. There
is also evidence that the purpose of the phrase in the English Bill
of Rights from which the Framers adopted the cruel and unusual
punishments clause was to prohibit excessively severe punishments
not sanctioned by the legal system.6 4 Gross excessiveness has been
referred to herein as a second, perhaps less clear, core case.
Although these historical meanings illustrate the core cases,
they do not exhaust the meaning of the clause. They cannot, for
it is evident that the clause now proscribes punishments not thought
cruel in 1789. Whipping and ear-cropping were thought perfectly
proper, neither torturous nor excessive, when the Bill of Rights was
born. 1 5 Yet. today, courts would not uphold them as permissible
means of punishment. 6
An alternative to the historical view is the notion that the meaning of the clause varies over time. There are two basic arguments for
variable meaning. First, one can argue that although the Framers
meant to proscribe cruelty as they conceived it, prevailing ideas of
cruelty have changed since 1789, and the Court must be free to
reject the Framers' obsolete notions. Second, one can argue that
the Framers intended to proscribe cruelty, the moral concept, whatever its content or dimensions would be at any particular stage in
of the Court majority and suggests that an historical approach is the appropriate
method of analysis. He remarked in Woodson: "[Ilt is by no means clear that the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments embodied in the Eighth Amendment . . . was not limited to those punishments deemed cruel and unusual at the
time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights." Id.
163 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
164 See Granucci, supra note 8, at 852-60.
165 See 1 ANs ALs OF CONG. 754 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789). During the
first Congress' debates on the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Mr. Livermore articulated the views of his contemporaries: "[I]t is sometimes necessary to hang a man,
villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we
in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are
cruel?" Id. A further indication of this outlook is contained in Congress' first
criminal statute, prescribing 39 lashes for larceny and one hour in the pillory for
perjury. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 16-18, 1 Stat. 116 (1790). See Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 262, 263 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring).
166 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668-71, 684 n.1 (1977); Jackson v.
Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). The Court has not specifically embraced
the proposition that any paddling or flogging violates the eighth amendment, but
the Ingraham Court implicitly recognized the "cruel and unusual" character of
punishments such as whipping and ear-cropping.
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6
history67
For purposes of formulating the second argument it will
suffice to suppose that a particular conception of cruelty (the content
or dimensions of the general concept in a given individual or community, or during a particular time period) consists, roughly, of the
list of things that are considered cruel under that conception, together with the principles capable of generating new additions to
the list.168 This argument, then, asserts that the Framers did not
intend to enshrine in the Constitution only their own list of things
considered cruel, but rather that the concept of cruelty itself should
limit punishment. They intended the list of cruel punishments to
vary as prevailing conceptions of cruelty evolved.
The first argument for variable meaning is vulnerable because
it "suggests that the Court must change what the Constitution enacted." 169 The second argument is more defensible because, under
its formulation of the clause's meaning, fidelity to the text requires
judges to address the moral issue, by applying the moral insight of
their time to the challenged punishment1 70 This allows the Court
to reject the historical view through fidelity to the text. One
ground for accepting the second argument is that the Framers could
have employed specific language instead of a general concept if they
intended to adopt a particular conception of cruelty. 171 For example, in the sixth amendment the Framers listed specific requirements for criminal trials that spell out a particular theory of the
concept of a fair criminal process. The eighth amendment, likewise, could have provided that no one shall be put to the rack or
the thumbscrew, rather than that no one shall be cruelly punished.
Most members of the Court have now adopted the view that
the meaning of "cruelty" in the clause is variable, although it is not
clear that they believe they have arrived at this position through
fidelity to the text. The position most frequently stated is that the
clause "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
167 See

R.

DwonuN, supra note 117, at 135-36.

These two forms of argument

are based upon Dworkin's analysis.
168 This definition relies on a conviction that a general intuitive notion of a
moral concept will be sufficient for purposes of this analysis. The definition in the
text is influenced generally by L. WrrrGENSTE N, PHmLOSOPHCAL INVESTicATIONS
124-29 (1953).
This Article will not attempt to elaborate a rigorous morphology
of the notion of a moral concept.
16 9 R. DwoRxe, supra note 117, at 136.
70

See id. 136-37. Dworkin points out that the argument may not stop here.
He asserts that fidelity to the text is not necessarily determinative in constitutional
adjudication.
171 Id. 136.
'
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decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 172 This
phrase has become one of those movable semantic units that
acquires a life of its own as courts repeatedly invoke it. Taking the
phrase at face value, however, it quite clearly expresses the view
that the clause is meant to embody the moral concept of cruelty,
r3
and that specific conceptions of cruelty may vary over time.'
Thus, the import of the clause's meaning, as construed by the
majority of the present court, is that the appropriate constitutional
standard must be dictated by society's current conception of cruelty.
72

. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (Warren, C.J.).
The language of the Trop Court has been subsequently adopted by numerous justices
who adhere to a variable approach to the clause's meaning. See Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (Marshall, J.); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 336
(Stevens, J.); id. 352 (White, J.); XVoodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 301
(Stewart, J.); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (Stewart, J.); id. 227 (Brennan,
J.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J.); id. 269-70 (Brennan, J.);
id. 329 (Marshall, J.); id. 383 (Burger, C.J.); id. 409 (Powell, J.).
Perhaps the most eloquent statement of the variable meaning position was
articulated by Justice McKenna in 1910:
With power in a legislature great, if not unlimited, to give criminal
character to the actions of men, with power unlimited to fix terms of imprisonment with what accompaniments they might, what more potent instrument of cruelty could be put into the hands of power? And it was believed
that power might be tempted to cruelty. This was the motive of the clause,
and if we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we
cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only practices like the Stuarts
[sic], or to prevent only an exact repetition of history. We cannot think
that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised through other forms
of punishment was overlooked. We say "coercive cruelty," because there
was more to be considered than the ordinary criminal laws. Cruelty might
become an instrument of tyranny; of zeal for a purpose, either honest or
sinister.
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true,
from an experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore,
be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time
works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the
mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.
They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.
They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future
is their care and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which
no prophecy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore,
our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.
Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles
would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and
lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in reality.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1910).
17
3 The phrase also suggests that society is changing for the better or making
moral progress which will be reflected in evolving conceptions of cruelty. Acceptance
of this notion is not essential to the argument for variable meaning.
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B. Positive and Normative Approaches to Variable Meaning
Once a variable meaning approach to the clause is accepted, it
is necessary to face the crucial question in the jurisprudence of the
cruel and unusual punishments clause. To what sources should
judges turn in seeking contemporary moral insights on cruelty?
There are two basic approaches to this question. The first approach, which might be called positive, seeks objective indications
of whether or not a specific punishment is considered cruel by
society at large. The second, which might be called normative,
identifies principles encompassing the core cases of cruelty, and from
these principles, assimilates new or doubtful cases into the concept
of cruelty. Assuming, as was suggested earlier,'1 4 that the current
conception of cruelty consists of a list of things considered cruel,
together with the principles capable of generating new additions to
the list, the positive approach seeks evidence of what is on the list,
while the normative approach seeks the principles by which we
determine whether an uncertain item belongs on the list.
1. The Positive Approach
The positive approach to variable meaning has been applied
by Justice Powell 175 and Chief Justice Burger in the death penalty
cases. Justice Powell has argued that legislative enactments 17 and
the sentencing behavior of juries 177 are the primary indicators of
whether specific punishments are acceptable under contemporary
standards of decency. In addition, he has suggested that referenda
and public opinion polls may be utilized as indicators of public
sentiment. 17 Chief Justice Burger has stated that contemporary
moral judgments regarding the boundaries of extreme cruelty (adding an unexplained gloss to the constitutional text) may be inferred
174 See text accompanying note 168 supra.
175 Justice Powell has not completely accepted the positive approach as the
appropriate method of eighth amendment analysis.

His recent opinion in Coker

acknowledged that the ultimate constitutional decision is vested in judicial judgment

rather than objective indicators. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 603 n.2 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 436-38 (Powell, J., dissenting) (argu-

ing that the "legislative judgments of the people's chosen representatives" are the
most significant "indicator of the public's attitude").
177

Id. 439-40.

171 d. 438-39, 441 n.36. Justice Powell does not, however, consider public
opinion polls to be a meaningful or relevant indicator of prevailing moral standards.
Id. 441 n.36.
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from what punishments are on the statute books, from the rate of
imposition of given punishments and from public opinion polls.179
The positive approach is also evident in the opinions of Justices
White and Stewart, but it appears in conjunction with a normative
approach applied as a separate test. They apparently believe that
the "evolving standards of decency" maxim mandates the positive
approach, but that the clause's meaning requires, as well, an application of inherent principles of cruelty to the punishment in
question. s0 In his application of the positive approach Justice
Stewart has viewed legislative enactments as the crucial indication
of moral standards,' 8 ' while also citing referenda, jury behavior and
opinion polls. 182 Justice White has stressed legislative enactments,
and also has made reference to jury behavior, referenda, opinion
polls and state court decisions. 18 3
The trouble with the positive approach is that it reads the
clause out of the Constitution. Any degree of reliance on public
opinion polls, even if accompanied by disclaimers as to their weight,
is improper in constitutional adjudication. Opinion polls, ironically, show that the majority of the public favors few of the pro179 See id. 385-88 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). But cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. at 614-15 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discounting the fact that only three states
attempted to impose capital punishment for rape after Furman).
1s0 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion). After
quoting the "evolving standards of decency" phrase, Justice Stewart continued:
Thus, an assessment of contemporary values concerning the infliction
of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth
.Amendment.... T]his assessment . . . requires . . . that we look to
objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction.
But our cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of
decency with respect to criminal sanctions are not conclusive. A penalty
also must accord with "the dignity of man .
Id.
In Furman, Justice Brennan also appeared to adopt a mixed positive/normative
approach. He delineated four principles relevant to determining when a punishment violates the clause, the third of which focused on the standards of contemporary society as reflected by objective indicators such as jury behavior and legislative enactments. 408 U.S. at 277-79 (Brennan, J., concurring). The normative
aspects of Justice Brennan's approach achieved dominance in his Gregg dissent, in
which he relied exclusively on the dignity concept for his conclusion that the death
penalty was unconstitutional. See 428 U.S. at 229-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 175-76, 179 (plurality opinion).
182 Id. 181.
183 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 352-53 nn.5-6 (White, J., dissenting).
See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. at 593-96 (plurality opinion). In Coker Justice
White took notice of various objective criteria and applied them to the facts at
band. His analysis revealed that only three state legislatures had authorized death
for the crime of rape, and that nine out of ten juries in the state had declined to
impose the punishment. These facts were relevant to his conclusion that the sentence of death is a grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime
of rape. See text accompanying note 261 infra.
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tections embodied in the Bill of Rights. 18 This is not surprising;
given that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect certain
rights of individuals from an overreaching majority.1 8 5 Moreover,
opinion polls are subject to methodological errors, and may record
frivolous or ill-considered answers, or answers influenced by ex18 6

trinsic factors.
Judicial reliance on referenda and legislative enactments as
objective fildicators of contemporary moral standards is a little more
defensible than reliance upon opinion polls because these processes
are the institutionally sanctioned methods of lawmaking in our

society; therefore, they may have some degree of relevance in constitutional decisionmaking. 187 Nevertheless, conclusive reliance on
these indicators either through substantive definition or extreme
judicial deference is circular. Constitutional doctrine may not be
formulated by the acts of those institutions which the Constitution
is supposed to limit. To glean a list of permissible punishments
from those enacted by legislatures either assumes that legislators
never enact a punishment they think is, or may be, cruel or allows
the legislature to define permissible punishments by its enactments.
Such a view removes any role for a constitutional check, The
circularity of this aspect of the positive approach has been recognized in other areas of constitutional adjudication. Referenda have
been declared unconstitutional,'" as have prohibitions or regulations sanctioned by many state legislatures. 8 9
184 See, e.g., McCloskey, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 Am.
POL. Scr. REv. 361 (1964); Protho & Grigg, Fundamental Principles of Democracy:
Basis of Agreement and Disagreement, 22 J. POL. 276 (1960). Cf. New York
Times, April 16, 1970, at 37, col. 1 (random phone sample conducted by CBS
reveals that the public favors limitation of five out of the ten amendments).
185 See R. Dwomn=a,
supra note 117, at 192. The Bill of Rights may be
regarded as an original compact that society will preserve certain rights regardless
of current conditions. Naturally the compact will usually be invoked with reference
to a particular right only when majority support for that right is thin. In a related
vein, Dworkin has argued that constitutional rights are strong moral rights against
the government such that the government should not violate them even if it thought
that the majority's best interest would be served by doing so. Id.
186 See, e.g., Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty,
26 STAN. L. REv. 1245, 1264-66 (1974). See generally the essays in Parts III and
V of CGPrrA. Puisr-mmr IN =HE UNrrED STATEs (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds.
1976).
87
1
For example, they may affect the applicable standard of review. See text
accompanying notes 145-46 supra.
188 See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(article of state constitution approved by referendum violates equal protection).
189
For example, many states had "separate but equal" education provisions
which were invalidated by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); many
states had anti-abortion statutes which were invalidated by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); and many school boards had mandatory flag salutes which were
invalidated by West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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The problems attendant on the use of legislative enactments as
an indicator of the public conception of morality became obvious
in Woodson v. North Carolina.90 Although the three Justices in
the Gregg plurality cited the enactment of mandatory death penalty
statutes as evidence of current moral standards on capital punishment in general,' 91 in Woodson they declined to consider these
statutes as evidence of the public's moral acceptance of mandatory
death sentences for murder. Justice Stewart argued:
[I]t seems evident that the post-Furman enactments
reflect attempts by the states to retain the death penalty
in a form consistent with the constitution, rather than a
renewed societal acceptance of mandatory death sentencing. The fact that some states have adopted mandatory measures following Furman while others have
legislated standards to guide jury discretion appears attributable to diverse readings of this Court's multi-opinioned
decision in that case. 192
If Justice Stewart's argument was that some states enacted
mandatory statutes even though they offended current standards of
decency, he cannot have simultaneously contended that standards
of decency are defined by legislative enactments. If his argument
was that the boundaries of decency can generally be presumed from
the existence of legislative enactments, but not in this case, then he
has presented at least one occasion in which legislators have transgressed current moral standards. Furthermore, if Justice Stewart
meant that the Court can assume that legislators will not ordinarily
violate current moral standards absent special circumstances, then
the Court ought to develop criteria for determining when those
circumstances are present. The need for judge-made criteria to
determine when legislative enactments express a moral consensus
and when they do not, however, undermines the assumption of the
positive approach that objective indicators define the current
standards of decency.
The examination of jury behavior as an indicator of contemporary moral standards is not so obviously vulnerable to
criticism. At least those who serve on juries have been solemnly
charged to bring their best moral judgment to bear on the cases
190 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

291 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 180-81.
192428 U.S. at 298-99 (footnotes omitted).
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brought before them. 193 Juries are the traditional expositors of the
community moral consensus. The difficulty with this indicator is
that the frequency of jury imposition of an authorized penalty cannot provide unequivocal evidence of the moral consensus regarding
its cruelty. First, jurors may decide to be cruel on occasion; they
are not instructed that they must not be. Given that the Framers
thought it necessary to protect individuals from being cruelly
punished, it makes more sense to suppose that some juries, judges
and legislators will decide to be cruel than to assume that they all
will try not to be. Justice Rehnquist derided the plurality in
Woodson for trying to "save the people from themselves," 194 but
Justice Marshall would probably find that idea quite proper. The
clause, he has said, exists as "insulation from our baser selves," 19,
because a free society is not afraid to recognize and guard against its
inherent weaknesses, among them being the occasional temptation
to cruelty. Second, unless the consensus on cruelty is so complete
that no jury ever imposes a particular penalty, one cannot determine
whether a low rate of imposition indicates that juries think the
penalty is cruel or that juries reserve the penalty for those rare
heinous crimes for which they think it is not cruel. Similarly, one
cannot tell whether a high rate of imposition means juries think the
penalty is morally acceptable, or simply that they have been cruel.
State court decisions are also not so obviously vulnerable as
an indicator. Consider, however, that state court judges are supposed to determine moral standards under the eighth amendment
in the same fashion as the Supreme Court. Hence, if state courts
are divided on whether or not the death penalty is unconstitutionally
cruel, 196 one of two things must be true. Either the death penalty
19 3 The significance of this charge is minimized, however, in the case of the
death penalty. Jury behavior in capital cases is distorted because of the historical
practice of disqualifying jurors whose moral beliefs were inconsistent with the
imposition of death. This practice was found violative of the sixth and fourteenth
amendments by the Court and discontinued only relatively recently. Witherspoon
v. United States, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976),
discussed at note 48 supra.

194 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 313 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
195 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring).
196 Twenty-six state courts considered the constitutionality of death penalty
laws prior to Furman; only one struck down a state statute. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. at 442 n.37 (Powell, J., dissenting). See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d
628, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972) (striking
down California death penalty statute as a violation of the state constitution's prohibition of "cruel or unusual" punishments).

The Anderson decision was "over-

ruled" by a statewide referendum in 1972.

See Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18

Cal. 3d 420, 434 n.1, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650, 666 n.1, 556 P.2d 1101, 1103 n.1 (1976).

After Furman, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found execution to be
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is cruel in some states and not in others, or some of the state courts
are wrong. If some state courts are wrong, the Supreme Court
must decide which, and it cannot cite state court decisions as evidence of the appropriate standard of cruelty by which it must do
this. If the death penalty is cruel in some states and not in others,
then undertaking the moral consensus inquiry on a national scale,
as the Supreme Court has done, is improper. Further, if the moral
consensus inquiry should proceed on a state by state basis, 19 7 then
each state court must be presumed to be right about the moral
consensus on cruelty in its state, and there is no role for Supreme
Court review. If there is to be a role for review, then, although
weight may be given to state court decisions, they cannot be utilized
to determine the applicable substantive standard the Supreme Court
must apply.
2. The Normative Approach
Justice Marshall has not taken the positive approach to ascertaining current moral standards through objective indicators.
Rather than focusing on the surface perceptions of the populace's
views regarding various aspects of cruelty, Marshall has attempted
to assess the deeply-held principles of the public, and has hypothesized about their underlying sentiment toward specific punishments. He explained in Furman, and repeated in Gregg, that
"whether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on
whether its mere mention 'shocks the conscience and sense of
justice of the people,' but on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities- would
find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable." 198 He believes that an informed citizenry would find the death penalty
morally unacceptable because it is "unwise," and because he "cannot believe that at this stage in our history, the American people
would ever knowingly support purposeless vengeance." 199 The
factors Marshall thinks would cause informed citizens to find the
death penalty "unwise" are:
unconstitutional under its state constitution. Commonwealth v. O'Neal, - Mass.
339 N.E.2d 676 (1975).
197 A state by state approach has been proposed by Polsby, supra note 33, at
28-29. There are vexing problems in determining "community" moral standards,
however, as the Court's struggle with the obscenity issue has demonstrated. See,
e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
198Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J.,concurring).
199 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 363.
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that the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than
life imprisonment, that convicted murderers are rarely
executed, but are usually sentenced to a term in prison;
that convicted murderers usually are model prisoners, and
that they almost always become law-abiding citizens upon
their release from prison; that the costs of executing a capital offender exceed the costs of imprisoning him for life;
that while in prison, a convict under sentence of death
performs none of the useful functions that life prisoners
perform; that no attempt is made in the sentencing process
to ferret out likely recidivists for execution; and that the
death penalty may actually stimulate criminal activity. 200
Marshall has also noted that the death penalty is imposed discriminatorily; that innocent people sometimes have been executed; and
that "the death penalty wreaks havoc with our entire criminal
justice system." 201

Because Justice Marshall refers to what informed citizens would
think, his position initially seems vulnerable to the criticism that
he is substituting his own opinion of what people should think for
what they, in fact, do think. It also might be thought to imply that
courts could rely on opinion polls if the polls "inform" people
before asking them their opinion on a punishment. 202
Despite these criticisms, Justice Marshall's Furman opinion
is suggestive of a more satisfactory way of appealing to prevailing
moral conceptions than the "positive approach" epitomized by
Justices Burger and Powell. Marshall assumes that the populace
is at least rational enough to conform its judgments to information
on the realities of the death penalty as applied. In defense of
Justice Marshall, this does not necessarily substitute for popular
opinion the opinion of the judge. The judge may hold different
views than those of such an informed populace. But in assuming
such judgments in conformity to available information, the judge is
requiring a certain minimal rationality on the part of the populace
before its views are to be taken seriously, and this is a normative
requirement. Such a requirement might be justified on the grounds
200 Id. 362-63.
Id. 364.

201
2 02

See Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth

Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 161, 196. After
providing survey subjects with relevant information about the death penalty and its
effects, these authors found decreased support for the death penalty. These empirical results provided some support for Justice Marshall's view that "informed"
citizens would reject the death penalty to the extent that their responses were not

based on retribution.
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of respect for each citizen's rational capacity, regardless of whether
such rationality is always exercised. But if this much rationality
may justifiably be required of the populace, it is difficult to see why
a more general coherence of moral views may not similarly be required. This leads to the idea that the prevailing moral judgment
of the populace regarding a given punishment may be properly
spoken of as moral consensus, and may properly shape a court's
decisions, only when that judgment can be inferred to be part of a
coherent moral position for each individual who holds it. A coherent position is reached when an individual's views on the
acceptability of a punishment are consistent with her central, deeply
held moral positions. 2 3 One arrives at a coherent moral position by
an ongoing process weighing each moral judgment one holds against
all of the others and making adjustments in order to preserve con20 4
sistency with the intuitions and principles deemed most basic.
For instance, a person may initially believe in both the absolute
sanctity of human life and the idea that death is an appropriate
punishment for grievous crimes. In a coherent moral position,
however, either the sanctity of life principle will have to be relinquished or modified (perhaps to exclude the lives of people who
have taken the life of another) or the idea that death is a permissible
punishment will have to be abandoned. Which way the reconciliation proceeds depends upon which idea the person more centrally
or deeply holds; this balance in turn depends on the relationship of
these ideas to the person's other moral convictions. The reason it is
often suggested that one ought to look to what people do rather than
what they say, or even more pointedly, that those who favor the
death penalty should be asked whether they would be willing to
pull the switch themselves, is that a person is more likely to have
reached a coherent moral position if she is going to be required to
transform her beliefs into action.
There is no sort of opinion poll that can determine what
people would think is cruel had they gone through the process of
arriving at a coherent moral position. The judge, therefore, must
utilize central moral concepts of our system on which there is a
consensus to infer what a coherent position would be with respect
203 See generally P. DworamN, supra note 117, at 248-53 (outlining the notion
of a moral position and distinguishing it from other reasoning processes such as
rationalization, prejudice, emotionalism, and parroting).
204The notion of a coherent moral position is essentially the same as Rawls'
concept of reflective equilibrium. See J. RAWLS, supra note 121, at 20, 48-51.
The coherence theory and its use as a method of ethical argument has been outlined
by Joel Feinberg. See Feinberg, Justice, Fairness, and Rationality, 81 YALE L.J.
1004, 1018-21 (1972) (reviewing A Theory of Justice).
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to the acceptability of any given punishment. Under this normative
approach to determining current moral consensus, a judge does not
necessarily rely on her own position, even though it would often
be the same as that inferred from central moral concepts. 20 5 Justice
Marshall can safely infer that the public's moral position on the
death penalty would be influenced by the knowledge that many
innocent people have been executed. This follows from the existence of a clear societal consensus that it is wrong to kill an innocent
person.
The application of moral coherence analysis to a given punishment involves at least two aspects. First, a court can look to relevant moral ideas in our society for guidance (for example, "it is
wrong to kill an innocent person"). This includes looking to relevant moral ideas in other areas of the law. The general tendency
of the law to consider life sacred 206 and to protect individuals from
forcible bodily invasions would be relevant to the determination of
whether a sentence of death for rape is cruel and unusual. Second,
the court can focus on cruelty, the moral concept in question; it can
take judicial notice of or evidence on general principles of cruelty
and the compatibility of these principles with the punishment at
hand. This process of delineating a collective coherent position on
a moral concept, with an eye toward a particular governmental
act 207 enables the Court to decide-in fact, is the process of deciding-whether the governmental act falls within the boundaries
delineated by that position.
C. Principles of Cruelty
In order to decide cruel and unusual punishment claims on
the basis of a collective coherent position, a court must be able to
identify principles of cruelty capable of generating additions to the
list of known cruelties. Therefore, and leaving aside for now what
special considerations may obtain when applying the word to punishment, as well as whether "cruelty" has a different meaning in
the context of governmental or societal actions than for those of a
205

See R. Dwonxrn, supra note 117, at 126-29.

See, e.g., Kadish, Respect for Life and Respect for Rights in the Criminal
Law, 64 CAIw. L. IEv. 871 (1976). Dean Kadish's analysis reveals that there is
206

no one general principle governing the sanctity of life in the law. He does identify,
however, several circumstances in which other societal values are given priority over
the law's protection of life.
207 if a court cannot identify a collective coherent position, it should seek the

collective consensus position regarding the appropriate direction for the court to
proceed in the face of moral uncertainty. See text accompanying notes 279-80 infra.
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person, 208 it is necessary to inquire what kinds of individual acts
are cruel.
The essence of cruelty appears to be the gratuitous infliction
of suffering-that is, the infliction of physical or mental pain without
good reason. If the motivation of an act is reprehensible because
the inflicter enjoys seeing people suffer, or knows there is no good
reason for inflicting the pain, one can be more certain the act is
cruel. In fact, under these circumstances one may be more inclined
to say that the inflicter is a cruel person as well as that the act is
cruel. The element of bad motivation, however, is not always
necessary to cruelty. The act of beating a child so severely as to
inflict serious injury would be considered cruel even if the inflicter
believed the beating was beneficial to the child's welfare. In contrast to this example, there may also be invasions of individual
interests which would not be considered cruel absent some element
of impermissible motivation.
A second characteristic of cruelty is hardness or lack of concern
or sympathy for human individuals. This element of cruelty also
is related to motivation. To degrade a person is to be cruel to her;
to be cruel is also to degrade oneself because one who is cruel will
2 9
be considered "inhuman" by her fellow humans.
The preceding discussion of the characteristics of "cruel" acts
illustrates the two main elements of cruelty which must be
evaluated in judging the constitutionality of punishments. First,
drawing from the discussion of degrading acts, a cruel act is one
which violates individual and collective human dignity. Second,
drawing from the discussion of the infliction of pain without good
208 Members of the Court have said that the word "cruel" as applied to punishments in the eighth amendment is not to be understood in the abstract.
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a
punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be
considered in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a common cold.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1961). Nor is "cruel' to be understood
in the dictionary sense.
The imposition and execution of the death penalty are obviously cruel
in the dictionary sense. But the penalty has not been considered cruel and
unusual punishment in the constitutional sense because it was thought
justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
209 The existence of the concept of cruelty to animals suggests that cruelty
involves a lack of sympathy not just for all human beings, but for all sentient
beings. This breadth of the concept need not trouble us here. Yet it is relevant
to notice that even though an animal is not the same kind of morally significant
being as a human being, a person who unnecessarily inflicts pain on an animal is
generally thought to degrade both herself and all humanity.
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These two principles

merit closer examination and comparison.
1. Dignity
The element of human dignity is a necessary part of any moral
conception of cruelty, as can be demonstrated by everyday experience. For example, it is cruel to make a laughing stock of
someone or to expose shameful personal information about a person
to the public or a peer group merely for the sake of seeing her
squirm. On the other hand, it would not necessarily be cruel to
laugh at the same person in private or to mention humiliating information in closed conversation, even though to do so might also
cause pain. The distinguishing factor in these two situations is
that the demand of dignity vis-a-vis one's fellows is more clearly
present in the former. The dignity element of cruelty is bottomed
on a moral obligation of each person to treat others as persons, with
the kind of equal concern and respect that we call "human" or
"humane." This felt moral obligation is intensified when persons
are in the presence of other members of the human community because the transgression of dignity in the presence of others makes it
obvious that the injured person is valued less than a person ought
to be valued.
Torture, the primary core case under the cruel and unusual
punishments clause, appears to be proscribed primarily because it is
inconsistent with the principle of dignity. There are punishments
that are too degrading (both to the victim and to the inflicter) to be
tolerated. The crux of governmental or societal cruelty is action
toward citizens with such a lack of concern and respect as to degrade
them and their significance as human persons. Under this definition it is appropriate to consider a repressive or totalitarian government cruel. A person subjected to torture is degraded and treated
as a non-person; she may in fact become a non-person in the sense
that she may lose those values, characteristics and responses we
associate with personhood.
Although the infliction of extreme and prolonged pain may
constitute the core meaning of degradation in this context, acts
lower on the pain scale, such as being pilloried, can be sufficiently
degrading so as to fall within this category of cruelty. Some governmental actions may involve little physical pain, but by cutting an
individual off from the human community, may be nonetheless
degrading. As a result, a punishment involving no physical pain
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at all, denationalization, has been assimilated into the dignity aspect
of cruelty because it foreclosed "the right to have rights." 210 Justice
Brennan has focused on this principle of cruelty and concluded that
the fundamental standard for evaluating punishments under the
cruel and unusual punishments clause is "the dignity of man." 21'
Referring to classic tortures, he said:
The true significance of these punishments is that they
treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects
to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the clause that
even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed
21 2
of common human dignity.
2. Excessiveness
The basic understanding of a cruel act as one that gratuitously
inflicts suffering, or inflicts suffering without good reason, generates
another major principle of cruelty, excessiveness. Behind this principle is the idea that there is enough pain in the world, and, hence,
it is "inhuman" to increase it more than is necessary. This element
of cruelty overlaps in large part with the dignity principle, because
to inflict gratuitous suffering on an individual is to fail to treat
that individual as a person, worthy of equal concern and respect.
The excessiveness principle is particularly germane to punishment cases within Types 2 and 3 involving proportionality and
power to criminalize. 213 It is gratuitous to punish someone for
behavior that is not punishable; it is excessive to punish someone
more severely than her crime warrants. Justice Marshall has quoted
Justice Field for the proposition that "[t]he entire thrust of the
Eighth Amendment is, in short, against 'that which is excessive',"
noting that the rest of the amendment prohibits excessive bail and
214
excessive fines.

This excessiveness strand of cruelty was utilized by Justice
Stewart speaking for the plurality in Gregg,21 5 but came to the
210 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
The use of denationalization as
a punishment for military desertion was viewed as dehumanizing by the Court

because it destroyed the individual's status in organized society and subjected him
to constant discrimination. Id. 101-02.
211 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).

212 Id. 272-73.
213 See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
2 14

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 332 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)).

215 Justice Stewart noted: "[Tihe inquiry into 'excessiveness' has two aspects.
First, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
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forefront of eighth amendment adjudication in Coker v. Georgia.
The Coker Court used a two-pronged excessiveness test, holding
that execution for the crime of rape was excessive and therefore unconstitutional.2 1
3. Are Dignity and Excessiveness Discrete Principles?
Although excessive punishment seems to be degrading to
human dignity,217 and the two principles apparently overlap to a
great extent, they may not be coextensive. 218 There are differences
in the emphasis of each principle which in the context of the cruel
and unusual punishments clause may usefully be thought of as reflecting divergent justifications for punishment. The excessiveness
criterion is formulated as related inversely to what is thought reasonable or necessary, while the dignity criterion is formulated independent of these considerations. As a result, there may be nonexcessive punishments that infringe human dignity, depending on
one's philosophical mode of justification for punishment.
One mode of justification (utilitarianism) has the result that punishment must be limited by the societal benefits it produces, while
another (retributivism) has the result that punishment must be
limited by the extent to which a person deserves to suffer an official
sanction. If one accepts the utilitarian justification, punishments
violative of the dignity principle may be non-excessive to the extent
they further a legitimate social objective in the most economical
way. For example, suppose it can be shown that the only way to
deter some particularly heinous crimes, such as terrorist bombings,
is public torture of those perpetrators who are captured. Torture
in such a case would be acceptable under a utilitarian theory of the
excessiveness principle, because it would be necessary to the achievement of a permissible goal of punishment. Nevertheless, torture is
not acceptable under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, and
pain.... Second, the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion)
severity of the crime...."

(citations omitted).
216 433 U.S. at 592. The two-pronged excessiveness test is further discussed
at text accompanying notes 244-72 infra.

217"A penalty .. .must accord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.' . . . This means, at least, that the
punishment not be 'excessive. ... Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality
opinion) (citation omitted).

218 But see Wheeler, supra note 8, at 853-55; Wheeler, Toward a Theory of
Limited Punishment II: The Eighth Amendment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN.
L. Rey. 62, 68 (1972). In both articles Wheeler argues that proportionality is the
crucial principle of the cruel and unusual punishments clause and coextensive with
the dignity principle.
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to this extent the utilitarian theory of justification has been fore219
closed by the Framers.
In contrast to the utilitarian theory, punishment imposed upon
an individual under retributivist or "just deserts" standards 220 cannot be non-excessive and still violate the principle of human dignity.
The underlying principle of retributivism is that criminals must
receive their "just deserts" because they, like all human individuals,
must be treated as ends rather than as means. Treatment of persons
as ends rather than means is required because of the inherent
dignity and worth of all persons. 221 Thus it appears that retributivist systems define dignity coextensively with permissible
punishment, with the result that all violations of human dignity
are inherently excessive.
D. The Excessiveness Principle and the Justification
of Punishment

The foregoing sections of this Article have urged a normative
approach to the problem of ascertaining a moral consensus on the
propriety of punishment based on contemporary principles of
cruelty. One of these principles is that punishment should not be
excessive, and in Coker, the Supreme Court developed a tvopronged excessiveness test for whether punishments are cruel under
21 9

See generally R. Dwonmx, supra note 117, at 193; Dworkin's theory of
rights maintains that the function of constitutional. rights in general is to forbid
utilitarianism as a justification for infringements of certain personal interests.
220 See text accompanying note 231 infra.
221 This formulation stems from the writings of Immanuel Kant, who maintained that each person has absolute value by virtue of existence as a rational being,
and hence cannot be used as an instrumentality to promote the ends of others.
"[R]ational beings . . . are called persons, because their very nature points them
out as ends in themselves, that is, as something which must not be used merely as
means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect)."
I. KANT, FuNDAmENTAL PRNCIpLES OF rHE MrApffysics or MonALs (1785),
reprinted in THE EssNTrIAL KANT 294, 330 (T. Abbott & A. Zweig trans. 1970).
Applying his principles to the practice of punishment, Kant wrote:
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead
it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has
committed a crime; for a human being can never be manipulated merely
as a means to the purposes of someone else

. ..

He must first be found

to be deserving of punishment before any consideration is given to the
utility of this punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens.
I. KANT, THE METAPHYsIcAL Emvrmxs OF JUsTicE 100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (1st
ed. 1797).
For some thoughts of a modem retributivist on the right to be treated as a
person, see Morris, supra note 125. For explorations of the notion of "treatment as
a person" in general, see P.F. STRAwso-, Freedom and Resentment, in FpEmom AND
BREsEMNmT 1-25 (1974); Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, 13
NoMos 1 (1971).
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the eighth amendment. This section will demonstrate that the
Coker plurality test comes close to the Hart/Packer mixed approach
to the justification of punishment 222 (which Justice Marshall may
have implicitly accepted as well 223), without attempting a unifying
rationale for the two prongs. It will be concluded here that the
mixed approach is an acceptable method of analysis, requiring both
utilitarian and retributivist judgments to be made with respect to
the constitutionality of a challenged punishment.
1. Excessiveness and Least Restrictive Means
Use of the excessiveness standard has the effect of forcing judges
to articulate the proper justifications for punishment, and its logic
requires some sort of least restrictive means analysis. Any punishment beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish justifiable ends
24
is excessive, and involves the gratuitous infliction of suffering,
unless "excessive" is not to be given its common-sense meaning.
But the common-sense meaning embodies our moral insight on
cruelty, and deviation from it would have to be justified. If "excessive" is to be a word of art in the punishment context, it might
be defined such that while punishment X will satify the permissible
ends of punishment, punishment X + Y is also justifiable ("nonexcessive") given the presence of uncertainty. The "permissible
ends of punishment" encompass all of the reasons the government
222

See text accompanying notes 235-37 infra.

223 See note 243 infra.
224 See text accompanying notes 213-16 supra. It is worth noting, incidentally,
that, because of the relationship of excessiveness to the justifications of punishment,
the "gratuitous infliction of suffering" may not exhaust the category of excessiveness.
A person may suffer less, in some sense, if put to death than if kept in prison for
life, but the death penalty would still be excessive if it were a greater penalty than
necessary to serve whatever purposes are found to be appropriate. Another way to
look at this problem, however, is to say that in such a situation it would be cruelgratuitous infliction of suffering-not to allow a convicted person to choose to be
put to death rather than imprisoned. See note 156 supra. A related problem was
raised in Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976), in which the Court upheld
defendant Gilmore's waiver of any right to challenge Utah's death penalty statute.
The waiver was essentially a choice to be executed. Justices White, Brennan and
Marshall dissented, stating that "the consent of a convicted defendant . . . does
not privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment." Id. 1018 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, in a separate
dissent, added:
I believe that the Eighth Amendment not only protects the right of
individuals not to be victims of cruel and unusual punishment, but that it
also expresses a fundamental interest of society in ensuring that state
authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments.
Id. 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, who wrote a separate dissent,
would have given the Gilmore case plenary consideration, given his perception that
the issues involved were of a substantial nature. Id. 1020 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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may give to morally justify invasion of personal rights in order to
punish. Any incremental punishment above that which is necessary
to accomplish these ends would have to be justified by an error or
uncertainty principle: that is, if the government cannot tell whether
X is sufficient or X + Y is, in fact, necessary, then X + Y is permissible. In order for this justification to be valid, however, the
decision to risk error in favor of the government rather than in
favor of the individual would have to be justified. The more the
punishment invaded fundamental individual interests, the harder it
225
would be to justify such deference.
Justice Marshall has explicitly recognized that the excessiveness
standard mandates least restrictive means analysis, 226 but other
Justices have attempted to avoid this conclusion, possibly to avoid
placing the burden of persuasion as to least restrictive means on the
states. Allocation of the burden, however, has nothing to do with
the choice of standard for what constitutes excessiveness.22 7 If excessiveness is the standard, then at least the petitioner ought to be
permitted to show that the punishment is excessive; that is, that all
permissible goals of punishment might just as well be accomplished
with a lesser punishment. In some, but not all, cases, the factors
relevant to risk of error dictate that the burden be placed upon the
228
government to show its punishment is not excessive.
2. Utilitarianism, Retributivism, and Mixed Approaches
What then are the permissible goals of punishment? In this
discussion, the two justifications which have been most often
proffered, utilitarianism and retributivism, will be examined.2 29
The utilitarian (teleological) justification for punishment is
prospective and collectivist: it depends on the benefit to society to
be gained by punishing someone.2 30 The retributivist (deontological) justification for punishment is retrospective and individualist:
225 See text accompanying notes 132-50 supra.
2

26 See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.

227 See text accompanying notes 103-07 supra.
228 See text accompanying notes 151-59 supra.
229 See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CnnRsmLi

SANcnor 35-61
(1968); note 153 supra.
230 The societal benefits are generally assumed to be the deterrence of the
punished person from committing further crimes (special deterrence) and the deterrence of others from committing crimes (general deterrence). Id. 39-48. Jeremy
Bentham is the father of utilitarian punishment theory. See 2 J. BENTsm, Ax
INTRODUCTiON TO THE PRuNcipLEs oF MoRALs AND LEGISLATION 1-55 (rev. ed.
1823).
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it depends on what the punished person deserves in light of her
23
past acts. '
Historically, utilitarian justifications for punishment were put
forward to limit retributivism.

232

Utilitarians argued that it would

be barbaric to inflict punishment only for the sake of vengeance
when no social good could result, and eventually utilitarianism replaced retributivism as the reigning "humane" justification of punishment.233 Today we have come full circle: retributivist justifications for punishment are being put forward to limit utilitarianism.
Modern retributivists argue that the "humane" treatment of persons
(that is, treatment founded upon the basic right to equal concern
and respect) is best accomplished in a system that focuses only on
what a transgressor deserves for breaking the social compact, thereby
taking advantage of others who did not, rather than on what society
23 4
is likely to gain by punishment.
There is a popular "mixed" approach to the justification of
punishment, most often associated with H.L.A. Hart- 3 and
Herbert Packer,23 6 but which was originally adumbrated by John
Rawls, 23 7 holding that punishment, as a general practice, may be

justified teleologically, but that the application of punishment to
specific individuals may be justified deontologically. Even this
view is vulnerable to criticism by modern retributivists, however,
because if each person may be punished only insofar as she deserves
it, but the general aim of punishment is utilitarian deterrence, then
under the mixed approach only those "deserving" people whose
punishment serves social purposes should be punished. To this
extent, a retributivist would say people are still being used as a
means, not ends. In addition, the mixed approach contains the
troublesome implication that "deserving" people whose punishment
23
1 Retributivism

is at least as old as the maxim, "An eye for an eye." The
formulation of retributivism as a theory of just punishment is attributable to
Immanuel K ant. See note 221 supra.
282 "Historically [utilitarianism] is a protest against the indiscriminate and ineffective use of the criminal law. [It] seeks to dissuade us from assigning to penal
institutions the improper . . . task of matching suffering with moral turpitude."
Bawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Pnr. REv. 3, 7-8 (1955).
233 Justice Marshall, who thinks retribution is a goal states may not pursue as
the sole justification for the death penalty, exemplifies this strand of "humane"
thinking. See note 78 supra.
234 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 125. Jeffrie Murphy has argued that this
reasoning constitutes a moral justification of punishment only if the social compact
is not a fictional construct but an actual social consensus. Murphy, Marxism and
Retribution, 2 PHI. & PuB. Arm. 217, 243 (1973).
235 H.L.A. HART, supra note 18, at 1-28.
236 H. PAcsmR, supra note 229.
237

Bawls, supra note 232.
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would not contribute to deterrence (if there are any) ought not to
be punished.
My own view is that there probably is no meta-principle that
can completely reconcile the two theories of justification. There
are uncertainty principles in many areas of philosophical and
scientific inquiry; it should not be surprising to find that uncertainty exists in moral philosophy. The source of this uncertainty
is the paradoxical nature of human self-perception-the perception
of one's self as profoundly an individual, and profoundly part of a
collectivity. The concept of a human individual absent the existence of and interaction with others makes no sense to us.233 Because each of us is profoundly part of a collectivity, 39 duties and
obligations that intrude upon otherwise permissible individual expectations can be justified in certain circumstances as necessary to
the maximization of the general welfare. At the same time, the
profound individuality of each of us compels accepting the notion
that each person has a right not to be "used" for the benefit of
others.240 The split between the individual and collective modes of
perception has appeared at all levels of human endeavor. Some intellectual eras, some governments, some people, and some parts of
each person's personality stress the individualist mode and some
the collective. Each point of view functions as a check on the other,
just as historically the retributivist and utilitarian justifications for
233 Because the concept of an individual person can only be completely understood with reference to a context of the human collectivity, it follows a fortiori that
human moral capacity and moral judgments can only be understood by reference to
individual membership in the collectivity. See S. TourLmn, AN ExAmiNATnOi or
THE PLACE OF RassoN iN ETHIcs, ch. 11 (1950); cf. T. NAGEL, THE PossrmxrvY OF
ch. 11 (1970) (refuting solipsism, the metaphysical and epistemological
ALTauISm,
theory that denies the possibility of knowing the existence of others). Thus, in
making moral arguments, the concept of the individual in theories emphasizing
individual rights and interests, though of central usefulness and power, cannot be
pushed so far that one loses sight of the context within which individuality has
meaning. The individual in a vacuum is a theoretical construct like the social
contract. Such constructs or theories are like flat maps of the world: very accurate
at the point of focus but quite distorted at the edges. The individual/society
construct is very useful in a variety of contexts but not in all; the justification of
criminal punishment is one of those contexts in which the distinction breaks down.
239A succinct expression of the collective mode is contained in John Donne's
Devotion XVII: "No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the
continent, a part of the main . . . [Any man's death diminishes me, because I
am involved in mankind... .. J. DomiE, DEvonoNs (London, 1624). As noted
above, see note 238 supra, it is relied on in some moral theories; Hilary Putnam
relies on it in developing a theory of semantics, see H. PuTNAm, Mum, LANGvUcE
sAND rry 215-71 (1975).
240 This idea was quintessentially expressed by Kant, see note 221 supra, and
has been bequeathed to rights theorists such as Nozick and Dworkin. See
R. Dwonzne, supra note 117; R. Nozicx, Asrsscu-, STATE Am UTOpiA (1974).
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punishment have not become reconciled but rather have reached
shifting truces. 241
In the criminal punishment area, perhaps the Hart/Packer
mixed position is a truce we can live with, in spite of the force of
modern retributivist criticism. 242 More significantly, from a practical standpoint, at least five members of the current Supreme Court
(the plurality of four in Coker, plus Justice Marshall 243) seem implicitly to have adopted either this mixed position or a dual position
without a unifying rationale.
3. The Coker Two-Pronged Excessiveness Test and Its Implications
In Coker,244 Justice White, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens, held a punishment to be excessive and violative
of the cruel and unusual punishments clause "if it (1) makes no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and
hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime." 245 Using the second excessiveness standard,
24

' This sketch of the function of utilitarian and retributivist tendencies in
justification of punishment is somewhat analogous to Duncan Kennedy's conception
of a split between individualism and altruism in private law. See Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
242 See text accompanying notes 237-38 supra. In light of that criticism, further examination of the question whether the mixed position does in fact underdetermine the class of persons we feel ought to be punished is warranted. To be
complete, the Hart/Packer model also needs to take into account the phenomenon
described below as "revenge-utilitarianism." See text accompanying notes 250-53
infra.
243 Although Justice Marshall has found retributivism to be an insufficient moral
and constitutional justification for punishment, see notes 78 & 233 supra, he apparently meant only to reject pure retributivism. The following passage from his
dissent in Gregg indicates his acceptance of the mixed view:
The concept of retribution is a multifaceted one, and any discussion
of its role in the criminal law must be undertaken with caution. On one
level, it can be said that the notion of retribution or reprobation is the
basis of our insistence that only those who have broken the law be punished, and in this sense the notion is quite obviously central to a just
system of criminal sanctions. But our recognition that retribution plays
a crucial role in determining who may be punished by no means requires
approval of retribution as a general justification for punishment.
428 U.S. at 237 (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (footnote omitted). In a note following
the quoted passage Justice 5Marshall cited the works of Hart and Packer as support
for his views. Id. 237 n.1 .
244 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). See text accompanying notes 1-7,
48-49 supra.
245 Id. 592. This test is a refinement of Justice Stewart's two-pronged treatment
of excessiveness adopted by the plurality in Gregg v. Georgia, see note 215 supra.
The language that would invalidate a punishment under the first excessiveness
standard when it "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment" is new in the Coker formulation.
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Justice White found death at the hands of the state to be grossly
disproportionate to the crime of rape.
Before considering how a court should decide whether a punishment is disproportionate to a crime, let us consider the relationship of these two standards in light of the utilitarian and
retributivist theories of punishment. In the first place, if one is a
retributivist, then the proportionality standard and the first standard
coalesce, because a punishment is disproportionate to a crime if its
sanctions are more severe than the criminal deserves. 246 Because
retributivists argue that the only acceptable justification of punishment is that criminals deserve it, punishing disportionately would
serve no acceptable goal of punishment. On the other hand, if one
is a pure utilitarian the two standards also coalesce, because a punishment is disproportionate to a crime if the social benefit of deterrence gained from it is less than the social harm caused by the
pain it inflicts. Because utilitarians argue that the only acceptable
goal of punishment is achieving a net social benefit, a punishment
that results in a net social loss serves no acceptable goal. 247 It is
clear, then, that the Coker plurality's two excessiveness standards are
distinct only if one adopts the Hart/Packer mixed view, or a dualist
view with no reconciling rationale. Interpreted in light of either
view, the first part of the Coker test requires that punishments result in a net social gain, and the second part functions as a limitation on particular punishments that may serve utilitarian ends, but
violate the element of human dignity inherent in retributivism. 24s
This does not mean that any member of the Court has explicitly made the connection between the dignity element of cruelty
and pure retributivism. Quite the contrary, Justice Marshall has
found that punishments imposed to serve the purposes of retribution
alone are constitutionally prohibited. 249 In coming to this con246 See text accompanying notes 220-21 supra.
247 See text accompanying notes 218-19 supra.
248 See text accompanying note 219 supra. Herbert Packer, prior to his
formulation of the mixed view in H. PACKEn, supra note 229, sought to demonstrate
that the proportionality limitation becomes much more difficult for courts to apply
if retributivism is ruled out as a proper justification of punishment. To illustrate
his point that reliance solely on a utilitarian rationale-as many liberal thinkers at
the time purported to do-could lead to insupportable results, Packer used reductio
ad absurdum style arguments that utilitarianism would support the execution of
violent psychopaths or rapists as a class. See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit
the Crime, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 1071, 1078-81 (1964). In his Coker dissent, Chief
Justice Burger cited these arguments in support of his conclusion that the execution
of rapists is in fact justifiable. 433 U.S. at 610 n.5 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
249
See note 78 supra.
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clusion he perhaps assumed that retributivism may dictate that a
person can sometimes deserve a punishment that would violate the
dignity standard, that is, a punishment within the core cases of the
clause. Classical retributivism (an eye for an eye lex talionis) may
have supported such a view, but dignity, like cruelty, is a moral
concept that evolves, and conceptions of dignity change over time.
Because the value underlying modem retributivism is to treat
people with the concern and respect due persons, a punishment that
violated our current conception of human dignity could not be
justified on retributivist grounds.
Perhaps another explanation of Justice Marshall's rejection of
retributivism was an intent to defuse another argument, which calls
itself retributivist (but is in fact utilitarian), and which plays havoc
with attempts to limit punishment. This argument proceeds along
the following lines: It is human nature to desire revenge against
criminals. If the government does not punish criminals to the
extent necessary to satisfy this desire, then people will take it upon
250 I will
themselves to get revenge, and social disorder will result.
refer to this argument as "revenge-utilitarianism." The reason that
it plays havoc with attempts to limit punishment is that judges will
be tempted to conclude that the amount of punishment needed to
serve this utilitarian revenge purpose is exactly the amount the
legislature has specified. 251 The amount of punishment needed for
utilitarian revenge is, however, the same type of question as the
amount of punishment needed for utilitarian deterrence. If in the
present state of human knowledge there is not enough evidence to
decide these questions one way or the other, then both should turn
on who has the burden of persuasion. The appropriate allocation
of that burden depends on an application of the risk of error principle developed above.252

A view that holds that courts are in-

capable of reviewing legislative decisions on revenge-utilitarianism
is untenable. On the other hand, when Justice Marshall said that
"it simply defies belief to suggest that the death penalty is necessary
to prevent the American people from taking the law into their own
250 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring);
note 79 supra.
2 51

For example, Justice White, dissenting in Roberts v. Louisiana, responded
to the argument that the death penalty does not serve legitimate penological goals
more effectively than life imprisonment by stating that "the widespread reenactment
of the death penalty . . . answers any claims that life imprisonment is adequate
punishment to satisfy the need for reprobation or retribution."
(White, J., dissenting).
2 2

- See text accompanying notes 121-59 supra.

428 U.S. at 354
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hands," 2,3 what he must have meant is that the burden of persuasion on such a claim should be on the government.
Moreover, in order to evaluate both deterrence and revengeutilitarianism arguments, it is the net social utility produced that
must be calculated. The proper way to calculate net social utility
is to subtract from the social gain produced by a punishment any
social harm attributable to it. When reviewing utilitarian
rationales the Court has not fully perceived this. It seemed difficult
enough to persuade the Court that the real issue with regard to
deterrence was not whether the death penalty deterred at all, but
rather whether it deterred more than life imprisonment.2 5 - Some
253 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 238 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J.,concurring) ("there is no evidence whatever that utilization of imprisonment rather than death encourages private blood
feuds and other disorders").
254 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring); id.
346-47 (Marshall, J.,concurring). Justice Marshall canvassed the statistical evidence
in Furman and concluded that it demonstrated that capital punishment "serves no
purpose that life imprisonment could not serve equally well." Id. 359. In Roberts,
Justice White surveyed the statistical evidence and found it inconclusive: "It is
quite apparent that the relative efficacy of capital punishment and life imprisonment
to deter others from crime remains a matter about which reasonable men and
reasonable legislators may easily differ." 428 U.S. at 355 (White, J.,dissenting).
Assuming that the burden of proof on the deterrence issue was on the plaintiffs,
White concluded that it would be constitutionally permissible for a legislature to,
decide that execution does in fact deter better than life imprisonment. In his Gregg
dissent, Justice Marshall disputed the validity of White's conclusion and assessed
the scientific flaws of a study published by Isaac Ehrlich, who had claimed to
demonstrate that execution is a statistically superior deterrent. 428 U.S. at 234
n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 A. EcoN. REV. 397 (1975)).
The Ehrlich article has provoked a flurry of commentary. See Baldus & Cole,
A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The
Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YArE
L.J. 187 (1975); Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209
(1975); Ehrlich, Rejoinder, 85 YALE L.J. 368 (1976); Peck, The Deterrent Effect
of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1976). An
earlier study by Thorsten Sellin had concluded that capital punishment has no.
significant deterrent effect. T. SEMIW, Tim DEATH PENALTY, A REPOwr FOR THE
MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AmEHcAN LAw INsarruTE (1959).
See
CArrAL Pu
in THE UNrrED STATES (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976);
THE DEATH PENALTY iN A.NERcA (H. Bedau ed. 1964). A recent work tending
to indicate that execution is not a superior deterrent is Forst, The Deterrent Effect
of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960's, 61 MnaN. L. REv. 743
(1977). See also Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths,
1976 Sup. CT. REv. 317.
There are those who would press a "common-sense" argument that execution
"must" be a better deterrent than life imprisonment, whether or not it can be proved
with hard evidence, because people are deterred more by what they fear more, and
most people fear death most of all. "No other punishment deters men so effectually
from committing crimes as the punishment of death. This is one of those propositions which it is difficult to prove, simply because they are in themselves more
obvious than any proof can make them." REPORT OF ROYAL Coimn srsSioN ON
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of the Court's members have alluded to the possible social harm
attributable to the death penalty-encouragement of violence ingeneral, "brutalization" of society, encouragement of deranged
people to commit murder as a bizarre form of suicide at the state's
hands 255-but none seems to have recognized that the measure of
these social harms must be subtracted from the revenge-utilitarianism and deterrence benefits, if any, attributable to the death
penalty in order to justify it on utilitarian grounds.
It is important to recall that even if a punishment can be
justified on utilitarian grounds, that does not end the inquiry under
the mixed approach adopted by the Court in Coker. A punishment
cruel to individuals under the dignity standard cannot be inflicted
25 6
even if it appears that it would create net social benefits.
In summary, a two-part test for determining whether or not a
punishment is excessive, and therefore impermissibly cruel, emerged
from the plurality's opinion in Coker, and is implicit, as well, in
the opinions of Justice Marshall. First, a punishment is excessive
and unconstitutional if it inflicts suffering to which no net social
gain is attributable. Second, even if a net social gain can be
attributed to a punishment, it is still excessive if it inflicts more
pain than the individual deserves, that is, if the punishment is disproportionate to the crime. Following the rationale of the mixed
approach, the first standard demands that a punishment be justifiable in the collective mode; the second demands that it also be
justifiable in the individualist mode.
PuNrsHmmT, 1949-1953, ff 57 at 19 (Cmd. 8932) (1953) (quoting statement
of Sir James Stephen in 1864), quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 347

CrrrL.

(Marshall, J.,
concurring). This "common-sense" argument makes two false assumptions: that murderers are rational calculators, and that death for murder would be
certain. One commentator has suggested that the reason why people cling to the
notion that death "must" be a superior deterrent is that they do not want to admit
their retributivism. See Polsby supra note 33, at 39-40.

255 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 351 n.113 & 368 (Marshall,
J.,concurring); id. 303 (Brennan, J.,concurring). For an attempt to analyze and
document forms of social harm attributable to the existence of the death penalty

see Solomon, Capital Punishment as Suicide and as Murder, 45 Am. J.ORxropsycH.
701 (1975); West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, 45 Am. J.
ORaaopsyci 689 (1975).
266 See text accompanying notes 246-48 supra. Using Dworkin's formulation,
if an individual has a right, it means the government cannot act in contravention of
the interest it protects even if that contravention would result in an overall "social
gain." See note 185 supra. Alternatively, one could arrive at the same position
through utilitarian reasoning by assigning very high "utils" in favor of honoring

the "right," overwhelming any "social gain" attributable to acts contravening the
"right." A utilitarian would make such an assignment of "utils" if she reasoned
that the "right" was essential to the long-run maximizing of social good in the system.
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E. Positive and Normative Approaches to Proportionality
This section addresses the question, earlier postponed, 57 of how
a court should determine how much punishment a person deserves
in response to a given crime. Hence, it focuses on the second part
of the Coker test. There are two perspectives from which proportionality determinations are traditionally made. The first perspective focuses on the crime and asks such general questions as,
"Can commission of rape ever render a person deserving of death?"
and such specific questions as, "Can commission of rape render a
person deserving of death if no additional acts of violence were
suffered by the victim?" The second perspective focuses on the
criminal and asks such necessarily specific questions as, "Does a
person with a history of social deprivation and oppression deserve
death for rape?" The specific questions are generally left to the
discretion of judges and juries within a range authorized by the
legislature, and the Court has constitutionalized consideration of
the specific questions whenever the death penalty is to be imposed.25 8
This section focuses on the general questions, involving the proportionality check on the legislature. Assuming, for example, that
the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional, is it permissible
for a legislature to decide that an individual may deserve death
for committing rape?
1. The Positive Approach
H.L.A. Hart has said that the notion of proportionality requires correlating penalties with a "commonsense scale of gravity"
of offenses. 259 This commonsense scale reflects "very broad judgments both of relative moral iniquity and harmfulness of different
types of offence." 260 There are several possible methods of trying
to discover whether the gravity of a given punishment correlates
properly with the gravity of a given crime on this scale. There are
those who have argued that one way to determine whether death is
2-7 See text accompanying notes 245-46 supra.
2 58

See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
059 H.L.A. HRT, supra note 18, at 25.
260 Id. Hart argued that the proportionality requirement inherent in the necessity of adhering to this commonsense scale of gravity is analytically separate both
from proportionality in a utilitarian sense (by which he meant a requirement that
the social harm caused by the punishment must not outweigh the gain derived from
it) and from proportionality in a retributivist sense (by which he meant a requirement that the punishment "fit" the iniquity of the crime). He argued that the
requirement of adherence to the commonsense scale in assessing penalties rests
instead on the fact that divergence from it risks "either confusing common morality
or flouting it and bringing the law into contempt." Id.
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a fitting punishment for rape, or two years imprisonment is a fitting
punishment for assault, is to use legislative enactments as a criterion.
This positive approach was one method used by Justice White in
Coker, who concluded that legislatures had found death to be a
disproportionate punishment for rape. He pointed out that although sixteen states had included rape as a capital offense prior to
Furman, only three retained the death penalty for rape when they
revised their sentencing statutes to conform to Furman. In response
to the argument that eleven of these sixteen states responded to
Furman with arguably mandatory death sentence statutes, and may
have chosen to eliminate rape as a capital crime rather than execute
each and every convicted rapist, Justice White noted that six of the
eleven had again revised their statutes since Woodson and Roberts
to provide a non-mandatory death penalty that did not include rape
as a capital crime, and that four of the five states which responded
to Furman with guided-discretion death sentence statutes did not
re-enact the death penalty for rape. 261
This positive approach to proportionality is vulnerable to the
same criticism earlier set forth with respect to the substantive meaning of the clause generally-that is, insofar as its results are treated
as conclusive, it is circular. 262 Such criticism, however, may be less
severe in a case in which the positive evidence (in Coker, the acts
of other legislatures) is invoked to demonstrate that a punishment
is now considered cruel (excessive) rather than to show that it is
not. Although one cannot be certain whether the punishment was
abandoned by some legislatures because of its cruelty or for some
other reason, use of the risk of error analysis outlined above 2 6 3 may
indicate that it is preferable to assume they thought it cruel. In
terms of protecting individuals, which is the purpose of the clause,
it is less risky--though perhaps still unfair to the state-to let the
decisions of other state legislatures constitute conclusive evidence of
what is cruel than to let them constitute conclusive evidence of what
is not cruel.
Another positive approach to the problem, though an oblique
2 64
one, is through the notion of equal treatment alluded to earlier.
There are two alternative prongs of this approach; the first lists
crimes of similar severity and determines whether their punishments vary significantly, while the second lists crimes subject to
261 433 U.S. at 594-95.

See text accompanying notes 184-92 supra.
See text accompanying notes 121-59 supra.
264 See note 101 supra.
262

263
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similar punishments and determines whether the severity of those
crimes varies significantly. If rape is considered about as serious a
crime as, say, kidnapping or armed robbery, then if the jurisdiction
in question finds lesser punishments sufficient for kidnapping or
armed robbery, it is punishing rapists disproportionately. If robbery
and kidnapping are considered more serious crimes than shoplifting,
then if the jurisdiction in question authorizes ten years in prison for
all of them, it is punishing shoplifters disproportionately. 2 1 Of
course, in using this method, the severity of crimes must be gauged
by some indicator other than the punishments imposed. Justice
White in Coker could not make a systematic use of the first prong
of this comparative approach in overturning execution for rape,
because Georgia also authorized execution for armed robbery and
kidnapping. Nonetheless, he did compare Georgia's treatment of
rape and murder, noting that even deliberate killing would not be
punishable by death under the Georgia statute absent aggravating
circumstances: "It is difficult to accept the notion, and we do not,
that the rape, with or without aggravating circumstances, should be
punished more heavily than the deliberate killer as long as the
rapist does not himself take the life of his victim." 266 Justice
White, by implication, relied, as well, on the second prong of the
comparative approach. Georgia authorized execution for both rape
and aggravated murder, and his opinion made it clear that he considered aggravated murder (or any murder) a worse crime than
rape. 617 State courts have used both this intra-jurisdictional comparative approach and the inter-jurisdictional comparative approach
previously discussed (looking at how other states have treated the
same crime) to analyze proportionality under state analogues to the
268
cruel and unusual punishments clause.
Neither the intra-jurisdictional nor the inter-jurisdictional approach exhausts the inquiry. It is possible to imagine a hypo265

The approach suggested by the second prong is inappropriate when the
crimes listed are all subject to the maximum possible punishment. Assume that the
maximum punishment a jurisdiction authorizes for any crime is life imprisonment,
and that both rape and murder are punishable by life imprisonment. Even if
murder is considered a worse crime than rape, it does not follow that rapists are
being punished disproportionately. That is, there could be a category of crimes
whose severity varied, all of which were determined to warrant the most severe
permissible punishment.
266 433 U.S. at 600.
267 Id. Whites use of the second prong, however, may in this case have been
logically invalid. See note 265 supra.
268 See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217
(1972) (possible life imprisonment for recidivist exhibitionism); People v. Lorentzen,
387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972) (minimum twenty years imprisonment for
sale of marijuana).
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thetical jurisdiction in which the legislature has decreed "too much"
punishment for its least serious crime and punishes all other crimes
in proportion to that standard. The intra-jurisdictional approach
might foreclose the obvious conclusion that all the authorized punishments were disproportionate to the crimes involved. Similarly,
this phenomenon could be repeated in many jurisdictions, diminishing the utility of the inter-jurisdictional approach.
2. The Normative Approach
Ultimately, proportionality comes down to a comparison of the
personal and social interests invaded by the criminal with the personal and social interests invaded by the punishment. This is the
normative retributivist issue of whether the punishment "fits" the
crime. Justice White and the plurality who struck down the death
penalty for rape acknowledged this when they discussed the very
strong personal interests that are violated when a person is raped,
and concluded that they were not as strong as the personal interest
in life itself.2

69

This line of reasoning does not imply that the

death penalty is proportionate only for murder and that for any
murder it is proportionate; it does not require an overruling of
Gregg and its companions which struck down mandatory death
penalties for murder. If that were all that now is meant by proportionality it could be reduced to "an eye for an eye." Chief
Justice Burger, dissenting in Coker, correctly pointed out that the
matter is not so simple as that, though he would argue, as I do not,
that sometimes "more than an eye" is appropriate "for an eye." 270
A civilized society would not decree that the proper punishment for
rapists is that they be raped.
The dignity basis of retributivism provides a normative approach to the proportionality issue. Serious crimes like rape and
murder are severe invasions of the dignity interests of other persons.
The criminal completely fails to treat the victim as a person, worthy
of concern and respect. That is no doubt the reason why such acts
are considered serious crimes and why the victim is justified in
fighting back, even to the point of taking life where life is threatened. Nevertheless, if the government is prohibited by the cruel
and unusual punishments clause from violating the dignity interest,
269 433 U.S. at 598.
270 The Chief Justice justified that position by noting the possibility of increased deterrence. He stated: "It is after all not irrational-nor constitutionally

impermissible-for a legislature to make the penalty more severe than the criminal
Id. 619 (Burger,
act it punishes in the hope it would deter wrongdoing ......
C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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then it cannot treat criminals the way criminals treat victims, or
even (necessarily) the way victims have a right to treat criminals.
Why ought the government's power to punish be so limited by
the dignity interest? First, a utilitarian argument might be advanced that for the government to adopt as a practice that which we
condemn as an isolated individual's act would be counterproductive
in the long run, at least if one objective of government is to preserve and foster respect for individual personal interests among
citizens. Second, a rights argument might be advanced which
would focus on the risk of error or arbitrariness notion. Practices
arguably violating human dignity could not be administered without some error or arbitrariness, and the seriousness of the risk of
harm to individuals because of the errors (that is, the importance
of the threatened personal interests) is one idea underlying the
notion of constitutionally protected individual rights against the
government. 271 Citizens can be supposed (using the social contract
metaphor) to have yielded to the government certain powers for the
purpose of promoting the collective harmony and welfare; but because of the danger to individual interests if that power is made
absolute, certain limitations respecting individuals are placed upon
the government, even if that results, in some cases, in the achievement of less social "good." 272 One of those limitations is a right
against being cruelly punished. It is not appropriate to ask whether
the criminal was cruel to her victim, and then to respect the right
only when the criminal was not. More generally, it is not proper
to say that a punishment that invades the personal interests of the
criminal no more severely than the criminal invaded the personal
interests of the victim is ipso facto permissible, for the punishment
may invade the criminal's dignity interest to such an extent as to be
cruel, regardless of her actions. At the same time, it may be proper
to say that a punishment that invades the personal interests of the
criminal more severely than the criminal invaded the personal interests of the victim must be considered disproportionate, and thus
impermissible under the dignity standard, even if that type of
governmental invasion does not violate human dignity when considered in the abstract (as the Supreme Court has held the death
penalty does not). The result of this line of reasoning is that the
government may adopt lex talionis only to the extent that the
dignity standard is not thereby violated. A punishment can be
invalidated if the personal interest it invades is "disproportionate"
2 71
2 72

See text accompanying notes 126-29 supra.
See note 256 supra.
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to the interest invaded by the criminal; however, because of the
dignity standard, a punishment cannot be validated merely because
the interest it invades is "proportionate" to the interest invaded by
the criminal.
V. CONCLUSION: FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE DEATH PENALTY

Coker v. Georgia will not be the last word of the Supreme
Court on the constitutionality of the death penalty.273 In conclusion, I shall consider briefly how the analysis developed in this Article
further bears on the acceptability of execution as punishment.
The irrevocability and enormity of the death penalty, as well as
the individual defendant's fundamental interest in life require that
the risk of error principle be used to resolve moral uncertainty
about the substantive meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments clause against the state. In more traditional terms, something approaching compelling state interest/least restrictive alternative analysis is the proper level of scrutiny. In addition, the burden
of persuasion on the issue of the existence of a moral consensus supporting the death penalty must fall on the state.
With regard to the clause's substantive meaning application of
the two part excessiveness test of Coker to the death penalty leads to
the following conclusions. Under the first excessiveness standard
of Coker, associated with utilitarian justifications for punishment, a
punishment is excessive and therefore cruel if it makes no "measurable contribution" to "acceptable goals of punishment." Applying this standard one is tempted to agree with Justice Marshall that
"there is no rational basis for concluding that the death penalty is
not excessive," 274 because no one has shown that it results in any
"measurable" net social gain.275 Instead of evidence there has been
273
On January 17, 1978, the Supreme Court heard arguments on two cases
challenging the Ohio death penalty statute on a variety of procedural and substantive grounds. In Bell v. Ohio, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976),
cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3840 (U.S. June 27, 1976) (No. 76-6513), the plaintiffs
challenged the procedures under the statutory scheme for consideration of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances and burdens of proof concerning those circumstances.
See 46 U.S.L.W. 3008 (U.S. July 5, 1977). In Lockett v. Ohio, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48
(1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3238 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1977) (No. 76-6997), the
plaintiffs challenged limitations on the consideration of mitigating circumstances, the
disproportionality of the death penalty for one who aids and abets the commission
of a murder by reason of participation in a conspiracy to accomplish armed robbery,
the burden of proof on mitigating circumstances and the exclusion for cause of
jurors with conscientious scruples against capital punishment. See 46 U.S.L.W.
3269-70 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1977).
274
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring).
27

5 See

note 254 supra.
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a presumption, not easily rebuttable, that it does, 76 a presumption
that I have argued is impermissible in view of the nature of the
fundamental personal right at stake.277 States that do not have the
death penalty have, as far as anyone can tell, experienced neither
higher murder rates nor increased social disorder from private
vengeance.278 This would tend to indicate, at a minimum, that the
death penalty is not the least restrictive means for furthering the
goals of deterrence and revenge-utilitarianism, assuming that both
of these goals of punishment are permissible. Anything that is not
the least restrictive means of doing something is excessive, unless a
different meaning for the word "excessive" can be justified. 279 If
courts do not know and cannot tell whether something is the least
restrictive means, however, who wins? The answer should depend
on which decision would cause more social harm if erroneous. The
kind of social harm that now results if the death penalty is not the
least restrictive means is obvious. The social harm that would result if the death penalty were the least restrictive means to permissible ends and were disallowed, is speculative. Utilitarian analysis alone seems to require that the death penalty be abandoned, at
least long enough to see whether any net social harm would result.
Moreover, regardless of utilitarian considerations, the dignity
standard relied upon by Justice Brennan and implied in the second
prong of the Coker test may now disallow execution. What is the
current moral consensus on whether or not execution of a person
violates that person's dignity so as to be unconstitutionally cruel?
Murder is the ultimate lack of respect for another person; it is not
possible to compare its penalties to the law's treatment of like cases.
It is possible to conclude that moral positions consistent with many
of our most deeply held values could be formulated both for and
against execution for murder. The death penalty has been the
subject of serious moral debate for more than a century. Though
my own position of reflective equilibrium is like Justice Brennan's,
I cannot demonstrate that it is "the" deep position and that current
standards of decency, properly characterized, now foreclose execution.
This Article has argued, however, that our system does have
settled principles that tell us on which side we ought to risk error
when an issue is the subject of such moral debate. There is a basic
276 I am referring here to the "common-sense" argument that death is worst,
so it must deter most. See note 254 supra.
277 See text accompanying notes 121-59 supra.
278 See note 254 supra.
279 See text accompanying note 225 supra.
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consensus on the principles of adjudication in the face of uncertainty. They are not merely principles for deciding the standard
of review a court should adopt in a given case; they are moral
principles in themselves. If we as a society are seriously divided on
whether a fundamental individual interest may be invaded by the
government under certain circumstances, it is morally wrong to
behave as if there existed a moral consensus that justified invading
28 0
that interest.
Furthermore, even if it might be permissible for the government sometimes to invade such a fundamental individual interest
under circumstances where we as a people are a house divided, it
might be so only under a system that could infallibly determine
which individuals deserve the deprivation in question. If infallibility is to be required for any case, it should be required where
the deprivation is irrevocable; and if infallibility is to be required
in any case in which the deprivation is irrevocable, it should be
required where the irrevocable deprivation is of life itself. We
may be a house divided on the abstract question whether execution
of an occasional citizen for murder violates the respect due to
persons. But when considered in the light of the fallible procedures
that are available to identify which persons are to be killed, we must
conclude that it does.
280 In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court noted the lack of consensus as to "the difficult question of when life begins," id. 159, and concluded:
"In view of all this [controversy] we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of
life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." Id.
162. Thus, the Roe Court recognized that in a conflict between fundamental rights
of individuals and the interests of the state, questions of the validity of a moral
theory concerning which there exists no consensus, should be resolved against the
state. The opposing deferential approach which I have argued against in this
Article is exemplified by Chief Justice Burger's Coker dissent. The Chief Justice
argued that the government ought to be allowed to "experiment" with the death
penalty "to prevent and deter" various crimes. 433 U.S. at 621 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).

